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OVERPARTICIPATION: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE
LAND USE PUBLIC PROCESSES
Anika Singh Lemar*
There are more opportunities for public participation in the planning and
zoning process today than there were in the decades immediately after states
adopted the first zoning enabling acts. As a result, today, public
participation, dominated by nearby residents, drives most land use planning
and zoning decisions. Enhanced public participation rights are often seen
as an unqualified good, but there is a long history of public participation and
community control cementing racial segregation, entrenching exclusion, and
preventing the development of affordable housing in cities and suburbs alike.
Integrating community engagement into an effective administrative process
requires addressing the various ways in which existing public participation
processes have failed to serve their purported goals. This Article critically
examines how public participation operates in land use planning and
approvals. It then proposes a new model, drawing lessons from other
administrative processes, in an effort to balance public input, legal
standards, and expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
A community room overflows with neighbors protesting a for-profit,
out-of-town real estate developer’s efforts to bypass local zoning. The
developer seeks to build what the neighbors believe is a noxious use on the
site of an existing housing development. State law favors the developer: a
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statute limits the grounds on which the municipality can deny zoning
approval. The developer trots out experts-for-hire who submit thick reports
dismissing resident concerns about safety, property values, and traffic.
The neighbors organize. Posting on social media and putting flyers in
mailboxes, they inform the community about the proposed development.
They rely on their knowledge about the neighborhood to describe the
detrimental impacts that the development will have on their community.
They educate themselves about the land use approvals and corporate
subsidies sought by the developer. They make Freedom of Information Act
requests in an effort to expose backroom dealings between local officials and
the out-of-town developer.
In response, the local planning and zoning commission slows the process
and keeps the public hearing open for almost five months. Neighbors become
lay public relations experts. Thanks to their mobilization, local newspapers
decry the project. The neighbors push creative legal arguments to support
killing the development proposal. Ultimately, the planning and zoning
commission, citing public testimony against the project, applies the
neighbors’ novel legal strategies to deny the application for zoning relief.
The town agrees to defend the strategy when the developer appeals the denial
in court.
The neighbors’ arguments echo those made by both academic and
practicing proponents of the community development movement.1 The
people most affected by a proposed redevelopment project are those who live
adjacent to it.2 Public participation mechanisms should both ensure that
residents have the opportunity to express local needs and require that the
redevelopment meet those needs.3 If the neighbors oppose the project, it
should not occur.4 Where existing law favors real estate developers
disfavored by the community, local government should not hesitate to
embrace novel legal arguments to empower the community.5
So, as a community lawyer teaching a community development clinic, did
I celebrate the perseverance, ingenuity, and political savvy of the
community? Was I comforted to see that moneyed development interests
and their lying, opportunistic, rapacious lawyers could be overcome by
political mobilization?
Well, no. I was one of those lawyers.6 My client, a small, volunteer-run
housing authority, sought, in partnership with a for-profit affordable housing
developer, to redevelop a fifty-unit affordable housing complex for elderly
1. William H. Simon defines community economic development as “(1) efforts to
develop housing, jobs, or business opportunities for low-income people (2) in which a leading
role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (3) that are accountable to
residentially defined communities.” WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 3 (2001).
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.2.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. (Though I prefer to describe myself as truthful, strategic, and pro bono.)
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individuals. The complex, built prior to the adoption of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 19907 (ADA), had reached the end of its useful life, and
its dated design did not serve its residents’ needs. Once rehabilitated, the
new ADA-compliant development would house sixty-seven low-income
families in a state-of-the-art building in a well-off, disproportionately white,
waterfront suburb just a few miles from a small, racially diverse city. Far
from comforted, I was appalled to hear neighbors use the rhetoric of
community to kill affordable housing in an exclusionary suburb.8
In fact, local control, community empowerment, and public participation
are among the building blocks of residential segregation. It has long been
the case that there is nothing inherently inclusionary about American notions
of “community” or “public participation.”
For generations, white
neighborhoods have shielded themselves in the rhetoric of community
control.9 In just one example, during the civil rights era, the Chicago Tribune
excused violent white rioters responding to a nonviolent civil rights protest
by faulting the desegregation advocates for marching in a white
neighborhood: “The demonstrators knew they were asking for trouble when
they invaded the Gage Park community.”10
There are, tragically, countless such examples. How, then, can earnest
cries for public participation to empower poor and marginalized people be
squared with the use of the same tool to exclude poor people and people of
color from tony, well-resourced neighborhoods?
The community
development and land use literatures are rife with the assumption that, when
it comes to community control and public participation in development and
7. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
and 47 U.S.C.).
8. Notably, they also weaponized the language of environmentalism, preservation of
Native American history, and public safety, using progressive rhetoric to advance a regressive
result.
9. See, e.g., JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL POLITICS AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 206–07 (2018). To this day, “[o]pposition to housing
development is more likely in areas with highly educated and non-Hispanic White residents,
with no relationship to national political preferences.” JONATHAN ROTHWELL, TERNER CTR.
FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, LAND USE POLITICS, HOUSING COSTS AND SEGREGATION IN
CALIFORNIA
CITIES
11
(2019),
http://californialanduse.org/download/
Land%20Use%20Politics%20Rothwell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQU8-7XGB].
That
opposition often manifests as cries for protecting or enhancing local control of zoning. See,
e.g., John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption amid a Housing Crisis, 60
B.C. L. REV. 823, 836–37 (2019); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Senate Passes Controversial
Zoning Reform Bill, CONN. MIRROR (May 28, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/2021/05/28/senatepasses-controversial-zoning-reform-bill/ [https://perma.cc/UX3T-TB8K]; Lisa Prevost, A
Push for Zoning Reform in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/realestate/connecticut-zoning-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/C5R5-DD6R]; Edward Ring, State Legislature Continues Its Assault on
Local Zoning Decisions, CAL. POL’Y CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://californiapolicycenter.org/
state-legislature-continues-its-assault-on-local-zoning-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/7YPZS7P2]; Geoff Beckwith, Legislature Should Protect Local Decision-Making over Zoning,
Land Use, MASS. MUN. ASS’N (Nov. 2017), https://www.mma.org/advocacy/legislatureshould-protect-local-decision-making-over-zoning-land-use/ [https://perma.cc/J5LK-962C].
10. BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND REAL
ESTATE TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA 200 (2009) (emphasis added).
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redevelopment projects, poor and marginalized people benefit from more
community engagement and public participation.11 Often, however, when it
comes to land use decision-making, public participation is utterly
dysfunctional—and poor people bear the brunt of that dysfunction.
There are two possible responses to broken public participation processes:
policy makers can eliminate the opportunity for public input or they can
better design participation processes. This Article proposes both reducing
opportunities for public participation and improving the processes that
remain. It sets out how to improve the public participation process that
accompanies planning and zoning—the rules applicable to all users of
property. It then argues that there ought to be extremely limited participation
opportunities when zoning officials apply those rules to individual
development proposals. In short, this Article calls for planning and zoning
to draw on lessons from other administrative processes, which distinguish
rulemaking from adjudication.
These proposed reforms are responsive to the failures of today’s land use
and zoning processes. This Article will begin by surfacing and analyzing
assumptions about public participation. It will then propose models for more
effective forms of public participation. Part I describes the ways in which
land use and related laws enshrine public participation in the real estate
development process. Part II describes common arguments in favor of
enhanced public participation and the history that grounds many of those
arguments. Part III critiques the ways in which public participation takes
place, both in practice and as idealized in the literature. Part IV proposes a
redesign of public participation and community engagement in the land use
sphere.
I. LAND USE AND ZONING’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS
The law bakes community control and public participation into the land
use process. No other local government function, whether budgeting,
policing, or education, features or prioritizes public participation to the
degree seen in land use law.12 The contours of those requirements have
11. See infra Part II.
12. American cities require an enormous number of new housing units each year to apply
for discretionary approvals, the process for which includes public participation. See infra Part
I.B. In San Francisco, for example, every unit is subject to a discretionary approval. See Moira
O’Neill et al., Developing Policy from the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay
Area to Inform California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 1, 49 (2019).
O’Neill and her co-authors did a deep dive into five California jurisdictions’ review of
development proposals and found that “[a]ll five jurisdictions we examined require
discretionary review for residential developments of five or more units. These discretionary
review processes apply even if these developments comply with the underlying zoning code.”
Id. Outside California, discretionary review is similarly widespread. Robert C. Ellickson,
Zoning and the Cost of Housing: Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater New Haven, and
Greater Austin, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1622, 1632 (2021) (“[Z]oning ordinances
increasingly make land-use decisions discretionary. A locality may expressly retain, for
example, the power to approve or reject a final site plan, subdivision map, or permit for a
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shifted, however, in the one hundred years since state and local governments
began adopting zoning regulations.
A. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
In 1924, the U.S. Department of Commerce published the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act13 (the “Standard Act”) with the hope, quickly realized,
that states would adopt and “[m]odify this standard act as little as possible.”14
By the terms of the Standard Act, states delegate their police power to local
governments to adopt zoning codes, provided those codes meet the
limitations set forth in the Standard Act.15 With respect to the process by
which each local government adopts a zoning code, the Standard Act—for
the most part—deferred to local governments: “The [local] legislative
body . . . shall provide for the manner in which such regulations and
restrictions and the boundaries of such districts shall be determined,
established, and enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or
changed.”16
The Standard Act does, however, require one element of the process: a
public hearing, to be held at least fifteen days prior to initial adoption of or
later amendment to a local zoning code.17 The Standard Act is explicit that
the public hearing should be open to all “citizens.”18 The Standard Act
explains that the hearing must be open to those who do not own property in
the relevant zoning district:
This permits any person to be heard, and not merely property owners whose
property interests may be adversely affected by the proposed ordinance. It
is right that every citizen should be able to make his voice heard and protest
against any ordinance that might be detrimental to the best interests of the
city.19

multifamily project.” (footnote omitted)). In fact, when by-right development is permitted,
observers will express surprise that no participatory process is available to them. Daniela A.
Tagtachian et al., Building by Right: Social Equity Implications of Transitioning to
Form-Based Code, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 71, 88 (2019); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 122 n.137
(2015). In the local budgeting context, by contrast, even a city like New York—which has a
touted, established participatory budgeting scheme—only subjects 0.4 percent of its annual
budget to participatory processes. See Colin O’Connor, Participatory Budgeting Grows in
NYC—Why Isn’t Every Council Member Doing It?, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.gothamgazette.com/government/5946-participatory-budgeting-grows-in-nycwhy-isnt-every-council-member-doing-it [https://perma.cc/LA2C-TN5W].
13. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. ed.
1926) [hereinafter STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT]. The Department of Commerce
formed an advisory committee in 1921 and published the first Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act in 1924. Id. cmt. at iii, 3. In 1926, it published a revised version. Id. cmt. at i.
14. Id. cmt. at 1.
15. Id. § 1.
16. Id. § 4 (footnote omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 4 n.28.
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While the Standard Act grants participation rights to all, it prioritizes
participation by nearby property owners. If immediately adjacent property
owners or the owners of 20 percent of nearby lots object to a proposed
rezoning, a 75-percent supermajority of the zoning commission must approve
a rezoning.20
Notably, the Standard Act distinguishes between decisions to adopt or
modify generally applicable zoning provisions21 and site-specific
decisions.22 The Standard Act endows zoning commissions with the first
category, the power to recommend legislative action to enact and amend
zoning ordinances.23 It charges boards of adjustment with the second
category, the power to make exceptions upon request of a party seeking relief
from the ordinance.24
The second category, site-specific relief, typically takes one of two forms.
First, a property owner might seek permission (termed a special permit,
special exception, or conditional use permit) to conduct a use conditionally
permitted by the zoning ordinance.25 Second, property owners might seek
relief from a zoning ordinance that imposes unduly onerous burdens on the
development or use of their parcels.26 These are commonly termed
variances.27 In the case of adjustment decisions, the Standard Act requires
that the aggrieved party be permitted to present evidence.28 It further requires
that all meetings be public and that any interested member of the public be
permitted to attend and observe.29 It does not permit members of the public
to testify or otherwise provide evidence in support of or in opposition to an
adjustment application.30
The Standard Act’s distinction between zoning decisions and adjustment
decisions comports with administrative law’s distinction between legislative
and adjudicative proceedings. Zoning adoption and changes implicate
broader interests. Adjudicative proceedings, applying a generally applicable
standard to a single parcel, present narrower issues.

20. Id. § 5.
21. Id. § 6. This Article refers to such decisions as “zoning decisions.”
22. Id. § 7. This Article refers to such decisions as “development approvals” or
“adjustment decisions.”
23. Id. § 6.
24. Id. § 7. In contemporary practice, these boards are more frequently called boards of
zoning appeals (or zoning boards of appeals).
25. Id. § 7(2).
26. Id. § 7(3).
27. See id.
28. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7.
29. Id. The rights to attend and observe adjudications, as well as access records and
filings, are, of course, core rights in and of themselves. See generally Judith Resnik, The
Functions of Publicity and of Privatization in Courts and Their Replacements (from Jeremy
Bentham to #MeToo and Google Spain), in OPEN JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 177 (Burkhard Hess & Ana Koprivica Harvey eds., 2019).
30. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7 (specifying only that
“[a]ll meetings of the board shall be open to the public”).
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B. Contemporary Public Participation Requirements
Zoning enabling acts have evolved since the 1920s, but they continue to
require public hearings prior to zoning decisions. Today’s zoning enabling
acts, like the original zoning enabling acts modeled after the Standard Act,
“generally require that city councils grant notice and an opportunity to be
heard to landowners whose land will be zoned”31 and make such opportunity
to be heard available to anyone who attends the public hearing.32 Often, there
31. Nicolas M. Kublicki, Land Use by, for, and of the People: Problems with the
Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 99, 109
(1991); see also 1 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8:13 (rev. 5th ed. supp.
2021) (surveying notice requirements for public hearings prescribed in various state zoning
enabling acts). Many zoning enabling act provisions require notification to nearby local
property owners adjacent to or within a certain radius of proposed zoning code adoptions or
amendments. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65091(a)(4), 65854 (West 2021); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-6511(2)(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 462.357, subd. 3 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-62.1 (West 2021); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-51, 53(d)(2) (2021); TEX. LOC.
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 211.006(b), 211.007(c) (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(B)
(2021); cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021) (notice of certain zoning changes required
for nonresident property owners who have specifically requested such notice). Others require
that nearby owners be notified about applications to zoning bodies regarding specific projects,
such as applications for special use permits, conditional uses, special exceptions, or variances.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65091(a)(4), 65905 (West 2021) (notice required for variances,
conditional uses, and appeals); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6512(b), 6516 (2021) (special use permits
and variances); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-12 (West 2021) (all “applications for development,”
including major site plans and variances); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 44-108(C) (2021) (all
variances or exceptions other than “minor” ones); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-41, 42, 66
(2021) (variances, special-use permits, and appeals). Even in states where notice to abutters
is not statutorily mandated, localities are usually free to establish these requirements via
ordinance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-3, 8-3c, 8-7, 8-26 (2021) (allowing, but not
requiring, localities to provide for additional notice in all matters requiring public hearings,
including zone changes, special permits, variances, appeals, and subdivision proposals);
DARIEN, CONN., ZONING REGULS. §§ 1041–1043, 1114 (2021) (imposing additional notice
requirements to abutters for zoning amendments and applications to zoning commission);
NEW ROCHELLE, N.Y., CODE §§ 331-121, 331-134, 331-146 (2021) (requiring notice to
abutters for zoning changes and applications for special permits, variances, site plans and
subdivision approval); SCARSDALE, N.Y., CODE § A319-13 (2019) (requiring notification for
appeals to zoning board); SYRACUSE, N.Y., ZONING RULES & REGULS. § 2, art. 5(3)(d)(3)
(2019) (same); see also N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a cmt. (McKinney 2021) (noting that while
New York’s statutes do not require notice beyond publication for hearings on applications to
zoning boards of appeals, “most local zoning laws provide for additional notification in the
form of a mailing to property owners within a designated distance of property which is the
subject of an application and/or posting conspicuous notices of the hearing on the property”).
But see N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Twp. Council of Twp. of Edison, 889 A.2d 1129, 1132
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2006) (interpreting use of mandatory “shall” language to conclude
that notification requirements in New Jersey’s state enabling act set a ceiling that localities
could not exceed with more stringent requirements).
32. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65351 (West 2021) (“During the preparation or
amendment of the general plan, the planning agency shall provide opportunities for the
involvement of citizens, California Native American Indian tribes, public agencies, public
utility companies, and civic, education, and other community groups, through public hearings
and any other means the planning agency deems appropriate.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-7d(a)
(2021) (providing that “any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be
represented by agent or by attorney” at hearings concerning zoning amendments and formal
petitions, applications, requests or appeals); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021) (“No
zoning ordinance or by-law or amendment thereto shall be adopted until after the planning
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are two required public hearings: one before an administrative agency and a
second before a legislative body.33 Furthermore,
[t]he courts have found that, even if a state statute does not provide for
notice and a hearing prior to the enactment of a zoning regulation, a
regulation adopted without notice and a hearing may be held
unconstitutional as contrary to the notice and hearing requirements required
by procedural due process.34

In the case of adjustment decisions, however, enabling acts are not so
uniform. The Standard Act did not anticipate public participation in
connection with adjustment decisions.35 In the post-urban renewal era, some
states added public participation requirements to the adjustment process.36
Today, in about one-half of states, zoning enabling statutes do not distinguish
between zoning and adjustment decisions with respect to public participation
requirements.37 In these states, which include high-housing-cost states like
California, Massachusetts, and New York, contemporary statutes require
public hearings open to all participants in both types of proceedings.38 In
addition, some local governments impose additional public participation
requirements on top of those mandated by state law. In Cambridge,
Massachusetts, for example, when considering an application for conditional
approval, the Planning Board is required to do the following:
[C]onsider what reasonable efforts have been made [by the would-be
developer] to address concerns raised by abutters and neighbors to the
project site. An applicant seeking a special permit . . . shall solicit input
from affected neighbors before submitting a special permit application.
The application shall include a report on all outreach conducted and
board in a city or town, and the city council or a committee designated or appointed for the
purpose by said council has each held a public hearing thereon, together or separately, at which
interested persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 44109(4) (2021) (providing that “any party may appear in person or by agent or by attorney” at
hearings held in connection with appeals to boards of adjustment); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4524-66 (2021) (same); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.006(a) (West 2021) (“A regulation
or boundary [pertaining to zoning amendments] is not effective until after a public hearing on
the matter at which parties in interest and citizens have an opportunity to be heard.”).
33. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65854, 65856 (West 2021).
34. Douglas A. Jorden & Michele A. Hentrich, Public Participation Is on the Rise: A
Review of the Changes in the Notice and Hearing Requirements for the Adoption and
Amendment of General Plans and Rezonings Nationwide and in Recent Arizona Land Use
Legislation, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 870–71 (2003).
35. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 7; see also supra notes
30 and accompanying text.
36. “Since 1973, many states have adopted statutory provisions requiring municipalities
to implement procedures that increase public awareness and participation in the planning and
zoning processes.” Jorden & Hentrich, supra note 34, at 876.
37. Anika Singh Lemar, 50 State Survey of Zoning Enabling Acts (2021) (unpublished
dataset on file with author). Case law can also play a part here by requiring, as a matter of
due process, that nearby property owners receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in
connection with a development approval application. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells,
492 P.2d 1137, 1141–42 (Cal. 1972).
38. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65905 (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 40A § 15
(2021); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 27-B (McKinney 2021); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-B (McKinney
2021); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725-B (McKinney 2021).
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meetings held, shall describe the issues raised by community members, and
shall describe how the proposal responds to those issues.39

Therefore, the ordinance assigns to the developer the responsibility to
conduct community outreach and respond to community concerns, even
before applying for land use approvals.
Requiring public hearings in connection with project-specific approvals
collapses the Standard Act’s distinction between zoning and adjustment
decisions. The distinction between zoning and adjustment decisions is
further diminished because zoning ordinances today are more restrictive than
they were prior to the late 1960s.40 Under such ordinances, if the existing
zoning does not permit anything, or anything realistic, to be built as-of-right,
then every developer must seek a development-specific approval. Indeed,
across the country, the urban “zoning pattern . . . is one of universal low
density, where any development with higher densities is treated as a
variance.”41 Much of what exists in urban centers is out of compliance with
local zoning codes; either it predates the adoption of zoning or it was
constructed only after seeking land use approvals that required extensive
public participation processes.42
Responding to restrictive zoning ordinances,43 developers seeking to build
multifamily housing and mixed-use developments must seek zone changes
for site-specific applications. The market demands these types of
developments, but too often zoning, even in urban areas and nearby suburbs,
fails to anticipate them. As a result, developers seek site-specific,
39. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ZONING ORDINANCE § 5.28.28.1(d) (2019).
40. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 325
(5th ed. 2021) (explaining that jurisdictions with zoning power “increasingly use . . . ‘wait and
see’ zoning, in which undeveloped land is placed in a [development-restrictive] holding
category, such as agricultural use, until someone expresses an interest in developing the land
for a more intense use”). Theories explaining why exclusionary zoning became rampant
starting in the 1960s and 1970s emphasize many different causes, ranging from inflation, see
William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters: How the Growth Machine Was Subverted
by OPEC and Earth Day, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 13, 13–
37 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017), to misguided, sprawl-inducing
environmentalism, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE
REGULATION 205–07 (2015), to racism, see SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION:
HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 107–10 (2004); David S.
Schoenbrod, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1420–21 (1969). Likely, all three
phenomena played a significant role.
41. EVE BACH ET AL., CMTY. OWNERSHIP ORG. PROJECT, THE CITIES’ WEALTH: PROGRAMS
FOR COMMUNITY ECONOMIC CONTROL IN BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 29 (1976),
https://ecommons-new.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/40494/
CitiesWealth.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/TCP7-AFYU].
42. See, e.g., Quoctrung Bui et al., 40 Percent of the Buildings in Manhattan Could Not
Be Built Today, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/
19/upshot/forty-percent-of-manhattans-buildings-could-not-be-built-today.html
[https://perma.cc/5WNN-KSP6]; Markeshia Ricks, Report: Re-Zone Westville Village, NEW
HAVEN INDEP. (Mar. 16, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/
archives/entry/westville_zoning/ [https://perma.cc/GK7M-2UM8].
43. Over the last five decades, highly restrictive zoning ordinances have become common
not only in the suburbs first designed to exclude affordable housing but also in cities. See infra
note 103 and accompanying text.
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parcel-specific zone changes, rendering the zone change not a generally
applicable regulation but instead a development-specific modification.
These are effectively adjustment decisions cloaked as zoning decisions.
Additional public participation requirements are sometimes layered onto
zoning and land use requirements. Some states, most notably New York and
California, impose state-level environmental review requirements on
adoption of an amendment to zoning ordinances.44 These “little NEPAs”45
include their own public notice and comment opportunities in connection
with land use and transportation planning decisions. These notice and
comment opportunities sit on top of the public hearing requirements in
zoning enabling statutes and zoning ordinances.
Many states facilitate redevelopment by enabling acquisition and
disposition of blighted sites.46 These urban redevelopment statutes also
include public participation requirements.47
There are many more opportunities for public participation in the
development process today than there were when states first began adopting
zoning enabling acts. Part II describes some of the arguments in favor of that
enhanced public participation. This backdrop informs Part III’s critique of
contemporary public participation processes and Part IV’s calls for reform.
II. WHY PUBLIC PARTICIPATION?
In Part III, I critique the ways in which public participation takes place and
the effects it has on the development process, both in practice and as idealized
in the literature. Before I do so, in this part, I describe arguments in favor of
enhancing public participation requirements and the urban development
history that often undergirds those arguments.
Arguments in favor of adding public participation requirements to
development processes typically center accountability to existing residents48:
the idea that new real estate development should meet the needs and desires
of people who already live in the neighborhood or town where the proposed

44. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189.70.10 (West 2021); N.Y. ENV’T
CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101–8-0117 (McKinney 2021).
45. NEPA references the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4347, under which the Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated regulations that
require the issuance of an environmental impact statement (EIS) and an opportunity for public
participation in the development of the EIS whenever the federal government undertakes
major actions that may impact environmental concerns. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1502
(2021). While NEPA does not apply to local and state zoning decisions, some little NEPAs,
modeled on the federal act, do. Most little NEPAs, however, apply to governmental siting or
funding decisions but exempt zoning decisions from their purview. See 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF
& DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S: THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 21.50 (rev. 4th
ed. Supp. 2019).
46. See John R. Nolon & Jessica Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 37 REAL EST.
L.J. 234, 237 (2008).
47. See id. at 237, 242–43.
48. See Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City: Toward
Development Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 26
(2013).
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development is located. In most localities, developers need only seek land
use approvals if their proposed development does not meet the strictures of
the local zoning ordinance.49 Advocates for more public participation
demand, instead, that all proposed developments be subjected to public
hearings.50 They seek accountability through a public process that prioritizes
public participation.
A. Unaccountable Government: The Scars of Urban Renewal
In the wake of disastrous, federally funded, locally implemented
experiments in urban renewal, early community development proponents
fought for, and won, additional avenues for public participation in the
redevelopment process.51 Mid-twentieth century urban renewal projects
razed existing neighborhoods in favor of highways or new developments—
sometimes commercial, but often public housing. According to many critics,
redevelopment was a top-down process that ignored local preferences and
disregarded social capital embedded in existing communities.
Redevelopment agencies ignored the value existing residents ascribed to
their neighborhoods.
While there are many valid criticisms of urban renewal, one frequent
argument is that these projects ignored community perspectives. Local

49. But see O’Neill et al., supra note 12, at 49 (stating that San Francisco, unlike other
cities included in the survey, subjects all development to discretionary approvals). Of course,
if the zoning ordinance is highly restrictive, developers may, in practice, have to seek
approvals for all proposed projects. Zoning ordinances that limit development to single-family
housing on large lots are considered exclusionary for this reason. Aesthetic zoning ordinances,
which overlay subjective approvals based on the appearance of a proposed building, also, in
effect, require every proposed project to seek and obtain discretionary approvals. Anika Singh
Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood Conservation Districts and the Regulation of
Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525, 1535 (2015).
50. See, e.g., Tom Angotti, “As-of-Right” Development: An Invitation to Ethical
Breaches?, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 19, 2003), https://www.gothamgazette.com/
development/1866-qas-of-rightq-development-an-invitation-to-ethical-breaches
[https://perma.cc/7C2K-YPVR]; Al Norman, What’s Wrong with ‘As-of-Right’ Zoning,
GREENFIELD RECORDER (June 24, 2020), https://www.recorder.com/my-turn-norman-citycouncil-34778458 [https://perma.cc/3S4Z-7H9L]. San Francisco is the best-known example
of a major American city with no as-of-right development. Every proposed project is subject
to a local approvals process. See O’Neill et al., supra note 12, at 49.
51. See David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A
Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701, 708 (2003) (reviewing WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL
POLICY (2001)) (“A third important criticism of Urban Renewal focuses on deficiencies in the
processes used to make these consequential redevelopment decisions. There is a strong sense
that residents of blighted communities were not given a meaningful role in decisions about the
redevelopment projects that affected them most acutely. Growth coalitions—forged by
governing regimes of mayors in league with state officials, business elites, and a cheerleading
local press—favored, and managed to secure, decisional processes designed to give actual
community residents little voice.”); Bezdek, supra note 48, at 28–29; Audrey G. McFarlane,
When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in
Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 871 (2000); Damon Y. Smith, Participatory
Planning and Procedural Protections: The Case for Deeper Public Participation in Urban
Redevelopment, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 243, 248 (2009).
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government officials, armed with federal dollars, razed neighborhoods
populated largely by low- and moderate-income people to make way for
highways and private development.52
The highways bifurcated
neighborhoods and facilitated white flight.53
Meanwhile, the
much-anticipated private development often never came. The textbook
example is New Haven, Connecticut’s Oak Street neighborhood, an
immigrant enclave razed to make way for a highway, called “the Connector,”
that would have connected I-95 to I-84, had it ever been built.54 With federal
funds, the local redevelopment authority cleared nearly nine hundred homes
and over three hundred small businesses for the planned highway
connector.55 Authorities displaced thousands of people.56 Other than a small
artery leading into downtown and a parking garage serving Yale New Haven
Hospital, the land remained vacant through the Great Recession.57
Elsewhere in the city, when private development did come, it did not last.
The downtown mall built on urban renewal land in the 1950s failed to
resuscitate New Haven as the region’s shopping center.58 The mall lost its
anchor tenant in the 1980s and collapsed entirely in the early 2000s.59
Analogous examples exist in cities across the country.60

52. Andrew Small, The Wastelands of Urban Renewal, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-13/how-the-bulldozerbecame-an-urban-block-buster [https://perma.cc/PDJ2-699X].
53. See Robert A. Solomon, Building a Segregated City: How We All Worked Together,
16 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 265, 281–90 (1997).
54. See LIZABETH COHEN, SAVING AMERICA’S CITIES: ED LOGUE AND THE STRUGGLE TO
RENEW URBAN AMERICA IN THE SUBURBAN AGE 127 (2019); see also DOUGLAS W. RAE, CITY:
URBANISM AND ITS END 333–37 (2003). The failure of urban renewal was not that New Haven
never built the Connector. New Haven and cities across the country consummated most of
the highway projects that they attempted. Urban renewal’s failure was that its policy agenda
turned out to be wrong. The car-centric approach to urban revitalization was simply, as an
objective matter, an ineffective, counterproductive way to try to improve cities. See, e.g.,
Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 775 (2007)
(finding that highway development has significantly contributed to central city population
decline).
55. History,
DOWNTOWN
CROSSING
NEW
HAVEN,
https://downtowncrossingnewhaven.com/history/ [https://perma.cc/WNW5-VZ4C] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2021).
56. See RAE, supra note 54, at 340–41.
57. See id. at 333–34. Over the last decade, the abandoned highway route has begun to
be redeveloped as high-end office space, laboratory space, and a chain drug store among other
uses. See New Haven’s Downtown Crossing Project, DOWNTOWN CROSSING NEW HAVEN,
https://www.downtowncrossingnewhaven.com [https://perma.cc/D7BF-ARMH] (last visited
Oct. 29, 2021) (providing updates on the status of the redevelopment).
58. COHEN, supra note 54, at 108.
59. Id. Consistent with the story I tell in Part II, a private-sector developer redeveloped
the mall as market-rate housing and Class A office space in 2003. Tara York, Chapel Square
Mall Gets Turned . . . Inside Out, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Jan. 18, 2004),
https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Chapel-Square-Mall-gets-turned-INSIDE-OUT11662256.php [https://perma.cc/9EGD-L7GD].
60. See Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, COMMENT. (April 1965),
https://www.commentary.org/articles/herbert-gans/the-failure-of-urban-renewal/
[https://perma.cc/AM3E-JDWM] (providing contemporaneous examples of urban renewal’s
failures in many American cities).
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Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, massive federal subsidies for
urban development slowed and the threat of unaccountable governmental
development abated. Rather than spend large amounts directly, the federal
government funneled smaller amounts through state and local government.
The United States Housing Act of 193761 and its 1949,62 1954,63 and 195964
successors directed federal subsidies to local governments, and later to
nonprofit entities, to construct housing.65 The later statutes also dedicated
significant funds for the clearance of blight.66 The housing legislation of the
1960s67 provided below-market interest rates to certain housing developers
and rental assistance to tenants.68 The Housing and Urban Development Act
of 196869 directed affordable housing production subsidies to both nonprofit
and for-profit housing developers.70
In the Nixon years, the federal government placed a moratorium on
housing subsidies.71 The moratorium ended with the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974,72 which “eliminated most categorical
urban development programs, including Urban Renewal, and replaced them
with a community development block grant” program that enabled localities
to choose how to allocate the funds.73 While the program still exists, the total
amount of funding, adjusted for inflation, is now a fraction of what it was in
1974 and is spread out over many more jurisdictions.74

61. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437).
62. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.).
63. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in
scattered sections the U.S.C.).
64. Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 654 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
65. John R. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal
Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URB. LAW. 249,
253–54 (1982).
66. GRACE MILGRAM ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., A CHRONOLOGY OF HOUSING
LEGISLATION AND SELECTED EXECUTIVE ACTIONS, 1892–1992, at 32, 52–53, 57–58, 79, 85
(1993).
67. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
68. Nolon, supra note 65, at 254–55.
69. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
70. Nolon, supra note 65, at 255.
71. See Agis Salpukas, Moratorium on Housing Subsidy Spells Hardship for Thousands,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/16/archives/moratoriumonhousing-subsidy-spells-hardship-for-thousands-stricter.html
[https://perma.cc/4DARYMKQ].
72. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
73. Nolon, supra note 65, at 255.
74. See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., TAKING STOCK OF THE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT 3–4, figs.1–2 (2017).
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As federal funding dwindled, low-income neighborhoods struggled, not
with unaccountable development, but with disinvestment,75 both private and
public. Disinvestment did create space, however, for more bottom-up real
estate development. “The Community Economic Development (CED)
movement arose out of the resulting struggle of urban residents, particularly
those in distressed inner cities, to access public and private capital to build
and operate essential community facilities and services.”76 The movement
supported (and continues to support) small-scale development undertaken by
community development corporations, which are locally controlled nonprofit
organizations. Community development corporations rely on what limited
pots of federal and local subsidy remain in the post-urban renewal era, as
well as grant funding,77 to build affordable housing, child care centers, and
small-scale retail shops in low-income communities.78 For decades, the
community development movement furthered accountable development by
undertaking projects directed by community residents acting through locally
controlled nonprofit, mission-motivated organizations.79
B. Unaccountable Markets: The Threat of Gentrification
For a time, neither government nor the private sector expressed much
interest in developing land in urban centers. As a result, unaccountable
development did not pose a threat to urban residents.80 Eventually, however,
urban areas saw a renewed interest from the middle class and the wealthy. In
the wake of this shift in desirable living patterns, community development
practitioners enlarged their focus to include not only government-sponsored
and funded development but also private development.
At first, low-income communities saw redevelopment take the form of
public-private partnerships involving government subsidies, whether in the
form of tax credits, cash, or land.81 Because the decision to grant a subsidy
is often a political one, the subsidy process required some amount of public

75. The term “disinvestment” is a misnomer in some ways. In many neighborhoods,
Black homeowners and renters invested significant amounts of time and money in their
neighborhoods, only to see those resources siphoned off by predatory absentee lenders and
landlords. See generally SATTER, supra note 10.
76. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999, 2001–02 (2007).
77. See Build Healthy Places Staff, CDC (Community Development Corporation), BUILD
HEALTHY PLACES NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.buildhealthyplaces.org/sharingknowledge/jargon/cdc-community-development-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/J2D9-SUFL].
78. SIMON, supra note 1, at 4 (describing small, locally controlled nonprofit organizations
developing affordable housing, child care centers, and a grocery store in low-income
neighborhoods in Boston).
79. See id.
80. As Professor John Mangin puts it, “[i]n the 1960s, ‘70s, and beyond, many cities were
desperate for any development they could get.” John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning,
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 92 (2014).
81. See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–June 1995, at 55, 62, 67 (describing the centrality of subsidies in urban economic
revitalization efforts).
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input.82 As market-rate housing and commercial projects in low-income
neighborhoods proved their profitability, however, government subsidies
were no longer defining features of redevelopment projects.83 The public
hearing requirements embedded in land use approvals processes ensured that
public participation continued to play a significant role in the redevelopment
process.84
Simultaneously, as described above, grant subsidies for affordable housing
production became increasingly rare.85 The Reagan-era Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC)86—which, because it relies on a
corporate tax credit, requires private market participation87—was ascendant;
today, it is the largest subsidy for affordable rental housing.88 In states that
do not dedicate capital funds or tax subsidies to housing production, LIHTC
is effectively the only available production subsidy for low-income
housing.89 Small-scale, community-controlled developers must partner with
large-scale nonlocal developers—both for-profit and nonprofit—in order to
navigate program requirements and satisfy the investors’ and syndicators’
requirements for participating in LIHTC developments.90 And small-scale

82. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
83. See Bruce Katz & Julie Wagner, Transformative Investments: Remaking American
Cities for a New Century, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/
articles/transformative-investments-remaking-american-cities-for-a-new-century/
[https://perma.cc/BWV4-VHQL]. I use the term “redevelopment projects” to refer to
development of land that has been previously developed. There are jurisdictions, notably
California, where this term has had a more specific technical definition. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 33010 (West 2021) (defining “[r]edevelopment project”).
84. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS: HOW OUR CITIES ARE INCREASING
INEQUALITY, DEEPENING SEGREGATION, AND FAILING THE MIDDLE CLASS—AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT 42–45 (2017); see supra Part I.
85. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
86. 26 U.S.C. § 42.
87. Similarly, the New Markets Tax Credit and Opportunity Zones programs rely not on
small, community-based nonprofit organizations but instead on large, institutional investors
to enact the federal government’s community economic development strategy (to the extent a
strategy other than corporate tax avoidance exists at all). See generally 26 U.S.C. § 45D; id.
§ 1440Z-2.
88. What Is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and How Does It Work?, TAX POL’Y
CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-creditand-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/PGC5-DL9U] (May 2020).
89. CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY ET AL., URB. INST., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO IT SERVES 15 (2018) (“LIHTC is the only major funding
source for producing and preserving affordable rental housing.”). Federal tax subsidies for
homeownership—disproportionately claimed by wealthy taxpayers—constitute the largest
federal housing subsidy by far and remain, for the most part, unscathed. See Jenny Schuetz,
Under US Housing Policies, Homeowners Mostly Win, While Renters Mostly Lose,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/under-us-housingpolicies-homeowners-mostly-win-while-renters-mostly-lose/
[https://perma.cc/XN78CALJ].
90. See Teresa M. Santalucia, Beginner’s Guide to Nonprofit and Affordable Housing
Partnerships (unpublished manuscript at 66–68) (on file with author); see also SCALLY ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 5. Investors typically require substantial financial guarantees, for example,
that small-scale developers cannot provide.
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projects are not feasible using LIHTC because the regulatory burdens impose
significant transaction costs.
As private actors played a larger role in urban redevelopment projects,
development became not only a goal of, but also a threat to, community
development practice. Increasing land prices made it difficult for community
development corporations and other local actors to purchase property.91
Thus, a fundamental tenet of community economic development practice—
“a leading role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations”92—
came under attack. And with outsiders now interested in developing
previously underinvested areas, the development process risked becoming,
once again, unaccountable to the community. All development, not just
large-scale government-sponsored redevelopment, now posed a risk. While
capital is mobile, low-income people typically are not,93 and that lack of
mobility exacerbated the danger posed by unaccountable development. Poor
people cannot easily leave a place that no longer serves their needs for
another place that does. As one democracy scholar concisely and eloquently
put it, “a permeable boundary makes equal civic membership impossible.”94
Development projects initiated by outsiders reflected and reinforced the
increased value of land in the central city.95 Rising urban land prices made
locally controlled development increasingly difficult, and higher land prices
reflected neighborhoods’ increasing desirability. The underlying desirability
reflected in increased land prices made it likely that developers would
construct high-end retail and market-rate housing—goods and amenities that
did not directly serve the needs of existing residents.96 Worse, fear of
gentrification and displacement made such amenities seem like net negatives.
“Objections to the political and cultural displacement of gentrification by
long-term residents emphasize the residents’ lack of voice in shaping the
direction of their neighborhood; that when improvements arrive they are not
the intended beneficiaries.”97 It is far from clear that private development
drives displacement, particularly in the majority of American cities other
than New York, San Francisco, or Washington, D.C.98 Nevertheless, it is
91. Heather Way et al., Uprooted: Local Efforts to Mitigate Displacement in Gentrifying
Neighborhoods, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 39, 47 (2019).
92. SIMON, supra note 1, at 3.
93. Kelsey Berkowitz, Stuck in Place: What Lower Geographic Mobility Means for
Economic Opportunity, THIRD WAY (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/report/stuckin-place-what-lower-geographic-mobility-means-for-economic-opportunity
[https://perma.cc/FRE9-L8A4] (observing that “college graduates are more mobile than
people who have a high school diploma or less”).
94. Email from Cynthia Farrar to author (Dec. 13, 2020) (on file with author) (quotation
included in comment on document attached to email correspondence).
95. See ALAN MALLACH, THE DIVIDED CITY: POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN URBAN
AMERICA 112–13 (2018).
96. See id. at 107–08, 112–13.
97. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities?: Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair
Housing Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835, 866–67 (2019).
98. See generally SHANE PHILLIPS ET AL., UCLA LEWIS CTR. FOR REG’L POL’Y STUD.,
RESEARCH ROUNDUP: THE EFFECT OF MARKET-RATE DEVELOPMENT ON NEIGHBORHOOD
RENTS (2021) (collecting empirical studies of market-rate development on local housing
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quite clear that, for many, fear of gentrifying investment has overtaken fear
of disinvestment as a driving force behind community development
practice.99
The focus on “accountable development” caused community development
practitioners to become reactive public participants, reliant on the public
participation process to influence their neighborhoods, rather than proactive
builders. As Professor Scott Cummings describes it, while traditional
community development generally uses background legal rules to structure
corporate entities and real estate deals that advance economic mobility, when
community development practitioners respond to private development, “[t]he
background rules that proved most critical . . . were rights to participate in
political decision making, particularly those embedded in the land use and
environmental review process.”100 Maintaining their focus on accountable
development, community development practitioners and proponents sought
to ensure that these private development projects served the interests of
existing communities. “Governance and participation in decisionmaking
also provides a buffer to some of the concessions to the inevitability of
market-oriented urban development in the ‘accountable development’
framework.”101
One of the mechanisms they used to influence private development was,
and remains, planning and zoning law and process. Scholars and activists
have long understood that exclusionary zoning can make housing
unaffordable in individual suburban towns.102 At least since 1980, restrictive
zoning has also played a substantial role in the design and building of
cities.103 Restrictive zoning is just that: restrictive. It restricts development
such that developers who seek to build anything—of any scale—must pursue
discretionary approvals. Those discretionary approvals entail processes that
accommodate extensive public participation.104
Using these approvals processes, community development practitioners
turned from using public participation to inform what locally controlled
organizations built to using public participation to oppose development by
affordability). See also Laurie Goodman et al., To Understand a City’s Pace of Gentrification,
Look at Its Housing Supply, URB. INST. (June 24, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urbanwire/understand-citys-pace-gentrification-look-its-housing-supply [https://perma.cc/5PXZEH7A] (suggesting that gentrification is slowed, not hastened, by permitting the development
of new housing supply).
99. See MALLACH, supra note 95, at 101 (arguing that some people “see every empty
house as a stalking horse for gentrification,” even in cities where gentrification is unlikely “in
the foreseeable future”); Miriam Axel-Lute, Talking About Revitalization When All Anyone
Wants to Talk About Is Gentrification, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://shelterforce.org/
2019/10/24/talking-about-revitalization-when-all-anyone-wants-to-talk-about-isgentrification/ [https://perma.cc/K785-889G].
100. Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in
the Figueroa Corridor, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 59, 70 (2008).
101. Johnson, supra note 97, at 867.
102. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Schoenbrod, supra note 40.
103. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1692 (2013).
104. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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outsiders. As described by Professors Sheila Foster and Brian Glick,
community development “attorneys use the procedural tools embedded in
land use laws, namely, the opportunity for public testimony and comment on
proposed development projects, both to organize residents and to form
coalitions of interests around the common goal of contesting the development
and influencing public officials’ ultimate decisions.”105 They do not rely
solely on making decision-makers aware of substantive issues; instead, they
lean on the power of delay inherent in the process: “attorneys also often use
such tactics to delay the regulatory process in the hope that the developer will
eventually back out or make concessions.”106 In Professor Foster and Glick’s
telling, in contemporary community development practice, the opportunity
to participate in regulatory decision-making is the primary lever used to
ensure that new development meets the needs of existing communities.107
While Foster and Glick write from their experience representing
community groups in New York, Cummings echoes their work in his
description of land use battles in Los Angeles: “The structure of the
entitlements process permits well-organized opposition groups with strong
political connections to delay or even prevent key approvals.”108 Cummings
recounts the importance of labor groups to building a coalition strong enough
to “make a credible threat of disrupting the entitlements process [made
possible by the participation process] . . . which would have increased costs
and uncertainty for the developer.”109 As a result, the coalition successfully
negotiated a community benefits agreement with the developer.110
More recently, Daniela A. Tagtachian, Natalie N. Barefoot, and Adrienne
L. Harreveld write from their experience partnering with communities in
Miami-Dade County to decry zoning rules that permit administrative
agencies to approve development applications without first soliciting public
input.111 The authors describe Miami’s recent adoption of a form-based
code, a type of zoning ordinance intended to instantiate pedestrian-friendly
development that accommodates a range of housing types and affordability
105. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2053–54.
106. Id. at 2054.
107. Id. at 2053–54. This focus on existing communities risks becoming an argument in
favor of the status quo and, therefore, an argument unlikely to serve the needs of people who
do not thrive in the status quo—low-income people and disempowered minorities. Christopher
Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings Clause, 42 VT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017);
see infra Part III.D.
108. Cummings, supra note 100, at 65. The development in question also implicated
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review, which included opportunities for
public comment and contestation, and public subsidies, which required city council approval
following a public hearing.
109. Id.
110. For more on community benefits agreements, see Vicki Been, Community Benefits
Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010); Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, in BUILDING
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 189 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R. Jones eds.,
2009).
111. Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 81.
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levels.112 These codes tend to permit greater density and diversity of uses
than traditional Euclidean zoning ordinances do.113 Form-based codes
require that developers design their projects in accordance with the “form”—
the city’s planning mandate. If a proposed development comports with the
form-based code, the applicant need not seek additional discretionary
approvals.114
The form-based code, prior to adoption, is often the subject of public
debate and participation.115 Cities and towns that have adopted form-based
codes typically engage in years of public hearings and outreach prior to code
adoption.116 Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld acknowledge that Miami
hosted hundreds of meetings over the course of more than five years to solicit
public input about the new code before the city adopted it in 2009.117
Nevertheless, they decry the developments rendered as-of-right by the
form-based code.118 They describe large-scale developments, including
hotel, office space, retail, and housing (both affordable and market-rate),
approved by the city without any formal, enforceable opportunity for public
input.119 Because such pathways did not exist for public participation, “the
community los[t] the leverage that they would have had if the developer
needed to get a discretionary land use permit in order to build.”120
C. Accountability Through Public Participation
While community organizations make use of existing public participation
processes,121 both practitioners (like Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld)
and scholars argue for even more opportunities for public participation in the
redevelopment process. Participation proponents describe existing public
112. “A form-based code is a land development regulation that fosters predictable built
results and a high-quality public realm by using physical form (rather than separation of uses)
as the organizing principle for the code. A form-based code is a regulation, not a mere
guideline, adopted into city, town, or county law.” Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED
CODES INST., https://formbasedcodes.org/definition/ [https://perma.cc/M4SS-7R52] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2021).
113. See John M. Barry, Note, Form-Based Codes: Measured Success Through Both
Mandatory and Optional Implementation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 305, 314 (2008).
114. See Mary Newsom, So, What Exactly IS a Form-Based Code and Why Should Anyone
Care?, PLANCHARLOTTE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://plancharlotte.org/story/so-what-exactlyform-based-code-and-why-should-anyone-care [https://perma.cc/MC83-JJHJ].
115. “Like a comprehensive land use plan and resulting implementing land use regulations,
form-based codes take into account the community’s vision for the municipality as articulated
through a series of meetings or ‘charettes,’ utilized to reach an agreement on the physical form
of the neighborhood.” 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23:3 (rev. 5th ed.
Supp. 2021).
116. “This process can take from as little as one year, but in at least one case took seven
years to complete.” Id.
117. See Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 83.
118. See id. at 86–88.
119. See id.
120. Tagtachian et al., supra note 12, at 88.
121. I am not, of course, arguing that practitioners should not use the participation
processes available to them and their clients in order to best represent their clients’ needs and
desires.
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participation processes as “relatively minimal,”122 arguing that opportunities
for public participation come late in the redevelopment process and that
public testimony is not taken seriously by decision-makers.123 Because
existing communities embody social capital not accounted for by
government or incoming private developers, if the redevelopment process is
to “account for a community’s social capital in land use law and policy,”124
it must take place “in consultation with the public.”125 Only the existing
residents have the knowledge necessary to account for existing resources,
needs, and social capital.126
Therefore, participation proponents, community development
practitioners foremost among them, have long advocated for “full
neighborhood hearings on new construction and ‘general approval’ by
[current] neighborhood residents as a precondition for new construction.”127
Professor Audrey McFarlane, commenting on both urban redevelopment
programs and land use processes, proposes that participation processes ought
to be longer than is currently typical and institutionalized in “sub-local or
community-based decision-making bodies.”128 Further, she argues that
participation requirements must be enforceable, “either in a set of sanctions
for failure to provide for meaningful citizen participation or, at the very least,
a guarantee that some level of an ability to affect the outcome of a
decision-making process is provided.”129 The remainder of this part sets out
advocates’ and scholars’ arguments in favor of enhanced participation rights.
I respond to these arguments in Part III.
1. Does Local Government Effectively Represent Residents’ Interests?
Participation proponents argue that local governments are not fully able to
serve the interests of current residents. Absent robust public participation,
the benefits of new development will accrue to outsiders, typically for-profit
developers, and the costs will be incurred by the existing community.
According to participation proponents, local government fails residents in
at least three ways. First, local government does not have the power to
negotiate with developers on behalf of residents. Because subsidy no longer
122. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions II, 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 269, 279 (2005) (noting that “these participatory procedures
are relatively minimal”) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering II].
123. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use
Decisions, 24 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 28–29 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering I].
124. Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and Urban Land
Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 532 (2006).
125. Id. at 546.
126. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 279.
127. BACH ET AL., supra note 41, at 22.
128. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 931.
129. Id. at 930. McFarlane separately argues that “the community must be included early
within a decision-making process, in fact at the agenda-setting stage of the process.” Id. at
930. This argument is consistent with my recommendations in Part IV.
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plays a significant role in urban redevelopment projects, “city/local
government has become a weaker player in a more dispersed system of
influence/power that drives urban development today.”130
Second,
negotiations are not transparent to residents. Professor Alejandro Esteban
Camacho argues that “important land use decisions are frequently made in
closed-door negotiations that exclude many affected parties, further
disenfranchising those with the least influence and fewest resources.”131
Finally, local officials engaged in such negotiation struggle to adequately
represent varied community interests and sometimes make decisions in their
individual interests, not those of residents.132
Process proponents generally make use of the claim that the “growth
machine” controls local politics, an argument put forth by Professor Harvey
Molotch in the 1970s.133 “Growth machine” adherents argue that local
government and local review processes are captured by real estate
developers. Real estate developers find common cause with local
government actors seeking to grow the city and expand the local tax base—
and therefore the value of a city’s real estate—at any cost.134 Partly because
of such capture, “the community segments most harmed by such favoritism
[toward real estate developers] are often the same ones who have historically
been denied influence in local politics, namely low-income and minority
neighborhoods.”135
In the eyes of participation proponents, because local government
privileges developers’ desires and fails to meet residents’ interests, the
positive impacts of development accrue to the developer and municipality.
Governmental redevelopment decisions suffer from a “legitimacy
challenge”: “The legitimacy challenge arises from the tremendous power
over neighborhoods’ wellbeing, wielded by politicians whose elections
depend upon campaign donations and by unelected agency officials with
limited oversight.”136 Meanwhile, the negative impacts of development
accrue to the residents of the community undergoing or adjacent to
redevelopment. “[T]he negative impacts of such deal-making [i.e., bilateral
negotiations between locality and developer over zoning approvals] all too
often fall on community members with little direct influence on the planning
process.”137 As a result, such bilateral decision-making is illegitimate and
can only be legitimated by additional collaboration with neighbors and

130. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2006.
131. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 6.
132. See id. at 52.
133. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political
Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOCIO. 309 (1976).
134. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 280; Camacho, Mustering I, supra note
123, at 39, 44, 47, 52; McFarlane, supra note 51, at 896, 931 (referring to the disproportionate
power wielded by “the growth coalition”).
135. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 43.
136. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 26.
137. Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123, at 5.

2021]

OVERPARTICIPATION

1105

community members.138 Professor Carol M. Rose, in a seminal piece,
described “[p]articipation or voice [as] a particularly venerable legitimator
of local government,”139 at least as regards minor, nonexclusionary zoning
adjustments or regional environmental issues.140 In fact, according to
participation proponents, if there is sufficient public participation, the scope
of judicial review can be narrowed because “widening public participation
over the life of agreements should address many of the substantive legitimacy
concerns that overshadow current land use negotiations.”141
2. Do Public Hearings Bring Local Knowledge and Interests to Bear?
Participation proponents also argue that public participation processes can
ameliorate information failures by allowing “[c]itizens [to] provide
informational inputs” where “land use conflicts represent information
shortfalls.”142 The public hearing process is an opportunity to elicit
information about potential development impacts that may not be known to
planning and zoning commissions. “Information about land use intentions,
impacts, and valuations is fragmented among a multitude of owners and other
constituents who are distributed across time and space. If bargaining were
costless, this dispersed information would be automatically aggregated in the
process of making land use deals.”143
Participation proponents assume that the decisions to be made during the
land use process are not technical in nature.144 Current residents will be the
most affected by the redevelopment, and current residents have valuable

138. “[A] nuanced conception of public regulation rooted in collaborative governance
theory can legitimize negotiated land use regulation by incorporating principles of local and
regional equity and deliberative democracy. By reformulating the negotiation and
implementation processes to include a more multilateral and adaptive orientation, negotiated
approaches to land use regulation can foster civic engagement and cooperation, achieving not
only fairer but also more effective land use decisions.” Camacho, Mustering I, supra note 123,
at 7; see also Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban Anticipatory Governance, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
75, 87 (2018) (“Developing stakeholder buy-in leads to greater legitimacy of outcomes.”).
139. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 883 (1983). Planning and Dealing focuses on
“piecemeal changes in local land regulations,” decisions that have implications beyond local
boundaries. Id. at 841. In the years since it was published, however, economists have
developed a richer understanding of the extraordinary degree to which local land use
regulations have detrimental extraterritorial impacts on both affordability and segregation.
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary
Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 317 (2004); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of
Zoning on Housing Affordability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8835,
2002); Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,
AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS, April 2019, at 1, 2; Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of
Inequality: How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443
(2020).
140. See Rose, supra note 139, at 846 (setting out an analysis of local government
legitimacy as to “piecemeal local land decisions”).
141. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 304–05.
142. Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (2013).
143. Fennell, supra note 142, at 388.
144. Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at 322, 325–26.
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knowledge, experience, and preferences that ought to inform the
redevelopment process.145 Professor Rose argues that land use hearings are
akin to negotiations between interested parties, not judicial determinations
applying the law to a set of judicially determined facts.146 As a result,
[a]ny meaningful determination of the specific needs and preferences of
parties affected by a land use project depends on the expression of these
needs and preferences through direct public participation. In this sense,
project-specific land use decisions are essentially and fundamentally land
use mediations, the resolutions of which ultimately depend on knowledge
of local conditions and interests, not technical expertise.147

To the extent development decisions turn on matters not currently within the
knowledge of existing residents, the process itself will educate them:
“Engaging participants in a public process generally leads to them being
better informed and more educated.”148 Thus, proponents of public
participation argue that additional public participation can legitimate
redevelopment decisions by balancing the costs and benefits between outside
developers and inside neighbors.149
3. Does Public Participation Result in Progressive Redistribution?
Participation proponents argue that enhanced public participation
processes will include traditionally excluded voices and will result in greater
redistribution from the wealthy to the poor. Again, participation proponents
assume that the people most affected by redevelopment are those who reside
in the area to be redeveloped. Because, as evidenced by the urban renewal
period, redevelopment can irreparably disrupt the existing community, robust
public participation processes are necessary to protect the resources and
social capital in that community.
Proponents argue that extensive participation processes serve an
instrumental function by redistributing the benefits of redevelopment from
wealthy outsiders to low- or moderate-income residents.150 Sherry R.
145. “Greater opportunities for public involvement are proposed as an antidote to these
democracy deficits, to enhance accountability and transparency, and to produce better
informed and thus improved results.” Bezdek, supra note 48, at 26; see also Camacho,
Mustering II, supra note 122, at 273 (arguing for “planning processes [to be] more
participatory and open”).
146. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
147. Camacho Mustering II, supra note 122, at 326.
148. De Barbieri, supra note 138, at 87.
149. Of course, public processes and adjudications need not include public participation in
order to serve an educational purpose. All open proceedings, whether or not public
participation is permitted, serve an educational purpose. Professor Judith Resnik recounts
Jeremy Bentham’s commitment to open judicial proceedings in part because he believed they
functioned to educate the populace. In her words, “all of us have entitlements in democracies
to watch power operate and to receive explanations for the decisions entailed. The observers
are, in this account, a necessary part of the practice of adjudication.” Resnik, supra note 29,
at 209. Open proceedings that do not permit public participation ought to play a larger role in
land use administration, a point to which I return in Part IV.
150. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 48, at 30; Camacho, Mustering II, supra note 122, at
315; McFarlane, supra note 51, at 930.
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Arnstein’s 1969 essay on citizen participation in the planning process151 is
particularly influential. Arnstein argues that participation redistributes
power.152 Only robust participation processes meet the “heavy burden of
countering marginalization of poor black communities and residents.”153
When existing residents lack capital, they cannot exert power by
participating in the marketplace by purchasing and redeveloping land. They
therefore look to the political sphere to influence the space in which they live.
The political sphere is also susceptible to vastly unequal power dynamics,
but participation proponents argue that public participation plays an
equalizing role. “Scholars studying urban politics recognize the value of
public participation as a means to reduce existing power asymmetries in
political decision-making.”154 Where use of the public participation process
pressures a developer to promise a portion of the development profits to
individual community actors through a community benefits agreement,
“[the] outcome is redistributive because it extracts greater resources for the
community through bargaining than it would otherwise be entitled to under
law.”155
The redistribution argument is bolstered by the notion that wealthy
communities have long exerted control over their built environment. “This
movement has grown directly from the increased power of low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods. They have demanded the same degree of
control for themselves long exercised in the wealthier districts.”156 In the
interest of fairness, then, low-income communities ought to have the same
power.157
151. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS
216 (1969).
152. Id. at 216 (Citizen participation “is the strategy by which the have-nots join in
determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated,
programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it
is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share
in the benefits of the affluent society.”).
153. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 897.
154. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 32.
155. Cummings, supra note 100, at 71–72.
156. BACH ET AL., supra note 41, at 29.
157. It is notable, however, that when the political process fails to advance the concerns of
the wealthy, they turn to the marketplace. They can purchase land rather than see it developed
for uses they dislike. They can leave a neighborhood that no longer suits their preferences. In
fact, their ability to leave amplifies their voices at public participation proceedings as they can
credibly threaten to move their homes and their tax dollars to another municipality if their
current town evolves in ways they do not like. See, e.g., LISA PREVOST, SNOB ZONES: FEAR,
PREJUDICE, AND REAL ESTATE 93–100 (2013) (recounting the failed redevelopment of a parcel
in tony Darien, Connecticut: when wealthy neighbors could not stop the construction of a
mixed-income development through the typical public participation processes, an anonymous
donor gave the local land trust enough money to purchase the parcel and hold it as vacant land
in perpetuity); see also Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Opposition to Defendants Incorporated
Village of Garden City’s, Garden City Board of Trustees’ and Nassau County’s Motions for
Summary Judgment at 22, MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Garden City, 985
F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 05-cv-2301), 2011 WL 13262332 (“Another resident
compared his idea of the specter of multi-family housing . . . to the ‘full families living in one
bedroom townhouses, two bedroom co-ops,’ ‘overburdened and overcrowded’ schools and
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4. Does Public Participation Have Intrinsic Value?
A final argument in favor of public participation is its “intrinsic value.”158
Professor McFarlane identifies arguments that local decision-making around
land use and development is an appropriate forum for direct democracy, or
something like it.159 Because public participation processes serve an
educational function, they facilitate the very construction of the
community.160
Recognizing that this idealized version of public
participation is rare, McFarlane nevertheless argues that even where
participation does not manifest as productive discourse, “meaningful
participation . . . is ultimately participation that is really an act of
resistance.”161
D. Is Poor People’s Participation Different?
Cummings, Glick, Foster, Tagtachian, Barefoot, and Harreveld all
represent or work alongside community organizations made up of poor
people and oftentimes people of color. They do not share the same
motivations as the white, suburban crowd that booed my client. On the one
hand are wealthy, typically white, community participants who have long
benefited from exclusionary practices. On the other are poor, often Black,
community participants who, as a result of racism, poverty, and white flight,
have never exercised control over their neighborhoods and should perhaps
be entitled to different rights and protections. Today, the minority of poor
people who live in now-desirable neighborhoods, for the first time, have
some ability to use the participation process to ensure that they benefit from
market-rate development.
In the context of local control of land use decision-making, many have
tried to differentiate between strains of resistance to new development:
[D]evelopment in neighborhoods currently populated primarily by people
excluded from other neighborhoods by racial and ethnic discrimination in
the past (and in some places, still today) now threatens to impose burdens
that the residents are not choosing to assume. That critical difference raises

‘overrun’ sanitation that he and his wife had intended to leave behind when they moved out
of Queens County.”), aff’d sub nom. MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581
(2d Cir. 2016); MHANY, 985 F. Supp. at 402 (“I moved here from Brooklyn so that when I
walked out of my house I did not turn to my left and see apartment buildings.” (quoting another
resident’s comment in opposition)); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, Tex., 109 F. Supp. 2d 526,
546 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“We lived in Mesquite for 17 years . . . and we left because of the
terrible effects that high-density development can have on what would otherwise be a great
neighborhood.” (alteration in original) (quoting resident’s comment at town council meeting
in opposition to multifamily project)).
158. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 902.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 912 (“[P]articipatory deliberation and action educates people to see their
common interests, and therefore, community grows out participation.”). But see infra note
249 and accompanying text.
161. McFarlane, supra note 51, at 928.

2021]

OVERPARTICIPATION

1109

a host of legal and social justice issues that need to be confronted
forthrightly.162

Usurpations of local control have long distinguished between “good” local
control and “bad” local control.163 Is it possible to make similar
differentiations in connection with public participation?
Professor Andrea J. Boyack distinguishes between those seeking to
address negative externalities of a proposed development and those simply
seeking to exclude potential neighbors.164 Those engaging in exclusion will
always claim that they, too, are simply seeking to exclude negative
externalities.165 Nevertheless, Boyack’s distinction has intuitive appeal. She
recognizes that “[t]he value preserved in upholding a community’s right to
exclude is an aspect of ‘status property,’ and protection of status typically

162. Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 217, 248 (2018); see also John
Infranca, Differentiating Exclusionary Tendencies, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1271, 1315, 1322–25
(2020) (acknowledging that there are policy reasons to provide additional process rights to
historically disempowered communities, but proposing instead to provide residents of
gentrifying neighborhoods transferable development rights).
163. For example, anti-snob zoning laws, which date back to the 1960s, do not apply in
towns where a certain minimum percentage of local housing stock is already affordable,
however that term is defined by statute. See Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in
Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293, 303 (2019).
164. See generally Andrea J. Boyack, Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451 (2017).
165. Affordable housing opponents are often sophisticated enough to couch their
opposition in concerns about the environment and traffic safety. Often, they resist openly
stating that they are opposed to new neighbors or housing for low-income people. See, e.g.,
Alexander Cramer, ‘Square Peg in a Round Hole.’ Neighbors Say Proposed Apartment
Complex Doesn’t Belong., PARK REC. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.parkrecord.com/news/
summit-county/square-peg-in-a-round-hole-neighbors-say-proposed-apartment-complexdoesnt-belong/ [https://perma.cc/QX2W-QZ88] (quoting residents’ general opposition to
affordable housing on environmental and traffic grounds and noting that some residents
expressed “support for affordable housing projects in general, but opposed this specific
proposal”); Molly Kraus, Zucchini-gate or Bust: Berkeley’s Battle for Affordable Housing,
BERKELEY POL. REV. (Oct. 31, 2017), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/10/31/zucchini-gate-orbust-berkeleys-battle-for-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/B6HL-N54L] (describing
resident’s objection to a proposed housing project based on concerns about reduced light on
her garden); Max Marin & Michaela Winberg, “Fecal Samples” Against Gentrification?:
Research Activism Raises Red Flags in West Philly, BILLY PENN (Mar. 29, 2021, 5:10 PM),
https://billypenn.com/2021/03/29/west-philly-poop-study-fecal-matter-gentrificationdevelopment-research-temple-gauthier/
[https://perma.cc/7TB9-TQUE]
(describing
antidevelopment research study “to investigate if the development would adversely affect the
neighbors’ microbiota and increase the risk of developing colorectal cancer”); Jessica
Williams, Plan for Affordable Housing in Leonidas, Lower Garden District Faces
Neighborhood Criticism; Mayor, City Council in Support, NOLA (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_f47834c8-ed3e-11ea-8560-8763bdb26542.html
[https://perma.cc/8MGB-VU9J] (quoting assertion that public criticisms of an affordable
housing project’s design, while purportedly based on historic preservation and building safety
issues, were in fact a pretext for “protesting the arrival of low-income neighbors, who are often
Black and Brown”); see also Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the
USA: Debate Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUS., THEORY & SOC’Y 107,
119–20 (2013) (collecting examples of affordable housing opponents “appropriat[ing]
‘rational’ planning jargon and socially acceptable language,” such as concerns over traffic and
overconcentration of poverty, “in order to frame the message of their opposition”).
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benefits society’s ‘haves’ at a cost to society’s ‘have nots.’”166 She worries,
however, that “similar goals to preserve a neighborhood’s character also
motivate community efforts to exclude in a very different context: resistance
of development by poorer, ethnic enclaves.”167
Professor Boyack does not seek to solve the problem by providing
different public participation rights to different categories of participants.
Instead, she proposes that the ultimate decision-maker undertake a utilitarian
analysis of whether a community ought to be entitled to exclude: “A
community’s right to exclude is unjustifiable unless its purported benefits
outweigh its costs, including costs borne by society and various would-be
community residents.”168 Using “community exclusionary powers . . . to
promote property values or group identity rather than to combat a legitimate
problem of negative externalities or a true tragedy of the commons” should
be disfavored, in Boyack’s analysis, by land use decision-makers.169 In fact,
extensive informal public participation mechanisms would render Boyack’s
solution less feasible. Her solution would best be accomplished in an
administrative process that required data collection and analysis in addition
to public comment.
Professor Rachel Godsil differentiates categories of public participants not
on the basis of exclusionary motivation but, instead, on the grounds that
urban redevelopment is less subject to extensive land use regulatory review
than is suburban greenfields development. According to Godsil, “our legal
system has adequate mechanisms in place, such as zoning and
subdevelopment permitting requirements, to address community interests in
the context of a suburb or small town.”170 In existing urban spaces, on the
other hand, land use laws do not provide a mechanism for residents to
participate in the decisions that lead to neighborhood change.171 The
renewed interest of well-off people in an existing neighborhood, because it
does not require a change in use, cannot be addressed through land use
decision-making. For example, the conversion of a multiunit brownstone to
a single-family home does not “require zoning changes. This means that
in-place residents of gentrifying neighborhoods lack many of the current land
use controls that others utilize to protect their autonomy, and new devices are
needed to afford that protection.”172 Godsil’s argument assumes that the
contested changes in urban neighborhoods do not require zoning changes.
While that is true in the case of a brownstone reverting to single-family use,
it is not necessarily true more broadly.173
166. Boyack, supra note 164, at 466.
167. Id. at 464.
168. Id. at 481.
169. Id. at 483.
170. Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 319, 324 (2013).
171. See Godsil, supra note 170, at 334; see also FLORIDA, supra note 84, at 58–60.
172. Godsil, supra note 170, at 334.
173. In fact, I argue below that redevelopment projects are typically more difficult, partly
because of public participation processes, than are “greenfields” projects. See infra notes
315–17 and accompanying text.

2021]

OVERPARTICIPATION

1111

Meanwhile, “the in-place residents in neighborhoods subject to
gentrification consider their neighborhoods to have been intentionally
abandoned and allowed to deteriorate by both governmental actors and the
forebears of the people now seeking to ‘gentrify.’”174 Residents of
neighborhoods undergoing gentrification lack “autonomy,” which is a
function of both racism and market power. “Once gentrification is
contextualized as part of the continuum that includes exclusion from suburbs,
denial of resources, and white abandonment of cities, the paradox is
explained. Gentrification of predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods,
like housing discrimination and exclusion, denies autonomy to the in-place
residents.”175 Land use laws do not provide a mechanism for existing
residents, long disempowered by government housing subsidies and the real
estate market, to opine on, much less influence, changes in their
neighborhood. “The move of suburbanites back to cities may be seen as
continuing a cycle in which others exercise autonomy, while poor people of
color often lack a corresponding choice.”176
Notably, Professor Godsil’s answer is not more participation or local
control but, instead, subsidies for existing residents to stay in neighborhoods
that experience dramatic housing cost increases.177 Godsil would provide
vouchers, as-of-right, to residents of existing neighborhoods that see a
25-percent increase in cost in a two-year period.178 Again, narrowing and
limiting public participation processes would not affect Godsil’s solution to
the problem of gentrification. Similarly, Professor John Infranca opts not to
provide additional participation requirements, for fear that the enhanced
process will have unanticipated negative consequences, but instead proposes
the allocation of transferable development rights to long-term residents to
compensate them and provide a market-based mechanism that would allow
them to benefit financially when their neighborhoods change.179
Others, starting from baseline assumptions similar to Godsil’s, Infranca’s,
and Boyack’s, argue in favor of differential treatment of different categories
of public participants. Urban planner Thomas Rudel argues that “more
effective land-use planning may require a concerted effort to democratize the
regulation of real estate development”180 and further argues that such
democratization will vary by geography:
In suburbs it may involve measures to insure the presence of disadvantaged,
elderly homeowners in decision making processes; in cities it may involve
legislation to facilitate citizen initiatives in land-use planning. In both
instances the reforms would increase the likelihood that land-use

174. Godsil, supra note 170, at 324.
175. Id. at 332.
176. Id. at 333.
177. See id. at 335.
178. See id.
179. Infranca, supra note 162, at 1315, 1322–25.
180. THOMAS K. RUDEL, SITUATIONS AND STRATEGIES IN AMERICAN LAND-USE PLANNING
131 (1989).
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authorities will pursue policies which reflect the sentiments of a wide range
of their constituents.181

Others do not ignore the fact that extensive, powerful, informal public
participation processes can privilege “bad” NIMBYs,182 but they decline to
opine on the specific contours of what the participation process should look
like.183
Can the design of public participation in the land use realm empower the
historically disempowered? Answering that question requires understanding
the hazards of public participation, which I endeavor to describe in the next
part.
III. HOW PARTICIPATION WORKS
“The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is
against it in principle because it is good for you.”
—Sherry R. Arnstein184

I am not the first community development lawyer to quote Arnstein’s
comparison of public participation to vegetables. But I might be the first to
wonder whether it is possible to have too much of a good thing. As an
affordable housing developer’s lawyer eating loads of spinach, how do I
remember those hearings described in the first pages of this Article?
Hundreds of neighborhood residents turned out to decry the local housing
authority’s plans to redevelop a forty-year-old housing development. The
current complex includes fifty studio and one-bedroom units, limited to
occupancy by elderly and disabled individuals.185 The housing authority’s
redevelopment plans increase the number of units to sixty-seven and open
181. Id. at 131–32.
182. NIMBY is an acronym for “Not In My Backyard.” It was originally used to describe
residents objecting to siting noxious uses, but “NIMBYism has grown substantially over
time.” FLORIDA, supra note 84, at 24. Today, NIMBY residents in both cities and suburbs
routinely object to the development of new housing units in their neighborhoods or
municipalities, with serious consequences for housing prices, housing segregation, and the
environment. Been, supra note 162, at 218, 221–23, 227–35.
183. See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 51, at 931 (“Of course, these recommendations in
some ways are directed at the easy question: Why is participation important? The harder
question of how to implement participatory schemes remains unanswered . . . . The answer to
the hard questions will necessarily be determined by the circumstances and context of
particular places.”). Anti-snob zoning laws effectively distinguish between towns that should
have control over local zoning and those that should not. Lemar, supra note 163, at 303. These
same laws, by cabining local control, similarly limit the import of public participation in those
towns whose zoning powers are cabined as a result of their failure to produce affordable
housing.
184. Arnstein, supra note 151, at 216.
185. While housing discrimination based on “familial status” is illegal under the federal
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(e), in 1988, Congress enacted an exception, further
refined in 1995, that permits housing developments to limit occupancy to elderly residents.
See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(d), 102 Stat. 1619,
1622–23 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)); Housing for Older Persons Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-76, §§ 2–3, 109 Stat. 787, 787 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(2), (5)).
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occupancy to all low-income people, without regard to age or disability
status. Half of the new units will be two-bedroom units that can
accommodate families. Nothing riles up suburbia like the threat of
low-income children infiltrating the school district. The town residents who
turned out to oppose the project made no effort to hide their vitriol.186
Of the over one hundred project opponents, as far as my students and I
could tell, all were white. In fact, the only people of color in the room were
one of my students and me. Most opponents were middle-aged, though a few
brought teenage children with them. Many were loud. They cheered when
a commissioner or witness said something they liked. They jeered when
someone said something with which they disagreed. On multiple occasions,
they physically accosted the chairperson of our client’s board. The chair of
the commission repeatedly asked them to quiet down so as not to disrupt the
meeting. In an effort to hear all public comments, the chair held the agenda
item over multiple meetings, lasting over three months in total, and permitted
people to speak more than once, thus privileging the loudest, most strident
voices. Extending the hearings caused my client to miss a once-a-year
funding application deadline, only adding to the costs imposed by the
delay.187
Just a few of the current project tenants attended the hearings. Even fewer
testified. One who did, the president of the tenants’ association, described
his daily ordeal: crawling out of his wheelchair to use the bathroom in his
studio apartment, constructed years prior to the passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Most tenants, however, citing the stress and difficulty
of testifying in favor of a project despised by so many of their neighbors,
refused to testify. They feared being heckled by the audience. Their
disabilities did not permit them to testify in front of over one hundred people.
The forum simply did not work for them. It is further worth noting that no
potential future tenants—or a group representing their interests—testified
either.
In other words, in the midst of the commissioners’ efforts to maximize
public participation, the process silenced many voices. Elderly and disabled
tenants feared testifying. And many supporters of the project opted to write

186. Some might wonder whether the process I describe here would have proceeded
differently had my client engaged in even more public outreach in the course of designing the
redeveloped housing. To that I respond as follows. First, the housing authority and its selected
developer went so far as to engage in a monthslong pause in order to locate another site in
town “better-suited” to multifamily development. The town eventually determined,
conveniently enough, that no such sites existed. Further, there is no reason to believe that
longer public dialogues will lead to creative solutions. Instead, such dialogues often entrench
people’s views. Finally, perceived economic incentives and thinly veiled racism cannot be
ameliorated through dialogue; they can only be ameliorated through the fair application of
reasonable laws, including civil rights laws—a remedy that was repeatedly stymied by public
participation in this case.
187. Like many wealthy suburbs, the town in question has a fraught and litigious history
of opposing affordable housing development. See Lisa Prevost, Judging Eminent Domain,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/realestate/02wczo.html
[https://perma.cc/VBU4-JPYX].
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letters of support or letters to the editors of the local newspapers rather than
appear in person. One such letter writer bemoaned the tenor and substance
of the hearings:
Lately, there has been a lot of concern in my neighborhood about the
[proposed public housing] renovations . . . . [S]ome have used derogatory
terms to describe potential new residents of [the public housing]. This
appears to be based on prejudice due to the ‘low income’ designation of the
apartments. I do not take issue with people expressing their concerns about
the [public housing] renovations, but I do take issue with people expressing
their views at the expense of the dignity of others. When we characterize
an entire group of people as deficient due to an attribute of that group—
skin color, sex, religion, or income—we divide our neighborhoods and only
damage our sense of community. Discussions marked with respect and
concern for all involved are certainly more representative of the [town] that
we all know and love.188

Indeed, discussions were instead marred by vitriol, fear, and unfounded
assumptions about affordable housing residents. Town resident William
Woermer testified:
The drug addicts are going to be here, believe me. Retirees, disabled, old
people—I have no objection to renovate the whole place and make it nice
for them. But don’t get too much of that riffraff in. There will be a lot of
riffraff. Then we go onto, with a project like this, you need security guards
in the area.189

The proceedings were horrible, but they were also quite typical. As
journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones recounted in a recent event hosted by the
National Low Income Housing Coalition, white communities become
“almost violent” in their opposition to affordable housing if they think Black
and Brown people will move in.190 We have long known that public
participation in land use processes operates differently than it does in other
administrative spheres. A 1983 lecture delivered at the Institute on Planning,
Zoning, and Eminent Domain provided a how-to for opponents of
applications for zoning approvals. George A. Staples, a lawyer citing his
representation of developers, opponents of developers, and municipalities in
support of his claim that his “views are totally impartial, completely without
bias, and absolutely objective,” started by pointing out that opponents rarely
need a “professional presentation.”191 Instead, “the most effective opposition
to zoning [approvals], particularly in the smaller city, is warm bodies, the
188. Christine Simpson, Letter to the Editor, At the Expense of Dignity, ZIP06
(Feb. 14, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.zip06.com/letters/20180214/at-the-expense-ofdignity [https://perma.cc/G35J-9Z8A].
189. Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated by Design: How Some of America’s Richest
Towns Fight Affordable Housing, CONN. MIRROR (May 22, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/
05/22/separated-by-design-how-some-of-americas-richest-towns-fight-affordable-housing/
[https://perma.cc/6BYN-LMCH].
190. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Racial Equity During and After the COVID-19 Pandemic,
Address at the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (July 7, 2020).
191. George A. Staples, Zoning for the Real World: A Primer for Lawyers, Realtors, and
Public Officials New to Zoning, 1983 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 47, 59.
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warmer the better.”192 Staples then proceeded to list “a number of
time-tested techniques which should be used” in every attempt to oppose a
grant of zoning approval:
Disparage renters as those who have no investment in their property. Talk
about loss of property values . . . . Speak of the home being the only
investment of the residential property owner . . . . Talk about potential
garbage problems. If there is little public transportation in the area, mention
that there is no bus service to get these low-class folks to work. Talk about
the adverse effect of cramming people together into small places . . . .
Mention pressure on schools and possible increases in taxes to provide
services for multifamily developments . . . . Talk about high density. (This
term has very little meaning, but it is a real fight phrase.) . . . Talk about
inappropriate access and increased traffic which will endanger school
children, particularly small elementary school age children. Anytime there
is a zone change, you can always talk about the violation of the existing
plan and a breach of faith with those who purchased in reliance on the
existing zoning. Nobody really knows what planning is, so you are free to
talk about bad planning.193

The list will sound familiar to anyone who has attended a zoning hearing,
urban or suburban, where a new multifamily development is under
consideration. Staples further advises:
[I]t is advantageous to encourage your people to grumble and make
derisory noises every time the opposition makes a point and to clap loudly
any time one of your own speakers makes a point or sits down. Be sure to
bring crying babies to the council room so that the board will realize that
you are so concerned that you are willing to deprive the poor little tykes of
sleep in order to stamp out this terrible evil being proposed.194

Staples suggests that opponents engage in “a bit of local chauvinism” by
talking “about how great this community is and how we have to protect it
against becoming another downtown Chicago,” even if nothing about the
proposed development (such as a sixty-seven-unit apartment building on five
acres of land) is akin to a Chicago skyscraper.195
Staples acknowledges that this approach is “silly” but argues (accurately,
in my own experience) that “it is also very effective.”196 Staples strongly
advises both developers and municipalities to seek legal counsel and engage
professional engineers to make their case and decide the case,
respectively.197 Project opponents, on the other hand, are advised that a
“logical presentation and an effective spokesman,” while “not absolutely
necessary,” might “add a whole lot of class to the operation,” which ought to
do whatever is necessary to “persuade the board to reject this fiendish plan

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 48, 58, 63.
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to destroy their neighborhood.”198 If “whatever is necessary” includes
exaggeration and lies, no worries.
Staples further comforts “the
squeamish . . . that there is little legal recourse against those who tell great
lies and spread atrocious nonsense at zoning hearings.”199
The advice Staples gives resides squarely in the category of “Funny
Because It’s True.” The notion that it is possible for public participation fora
to facilitate “discussions marked with respect and concern for all”200 is a
fundamental tenet of community development practice. But does that notion
accord with reality? In practice,
[b]ecause public hearings afford no real dialog, they lack the elements
necessary for a truly deliberative decision-making process. Public hearings
are a poor form for the development of adequate information about
complex community problems, do not promote a shared baseline of
understanding, and do not even attempt to promote a consensus.201

At best, then, they provide a forum for individual members of the public
to list grievances, one at a time, not in discussion with one another, in
three-minute increments. But, as anyone who has attended a local public
hearing or watched an episode of Parks and Recreation knows, public
hearings and other opportunities for participation can further devolve from
there.
A common response to the query why local land use law administration
does not resemble other regulatory regimes is that local control, infused with
lots of opportunities for public participation, lends legitimacy to a
particularly personal realm of administrative law. Perhaps informal
processes are appropriate where the topic approaches the personal—and
nothing is quite as personal as one’s neighborhood and neighbors.
Recognizing this sensibility, in a recent article, Professors David Markell,
Tom Tyler, and Sarah F. Brosnan use survey data to assess people’s
preferences as to how best to resolve land use disputes, especially in a context
where those disputes involve not only monetary but also sentimental
value.202 They found that respondents best trusted referenda to protect
sentimental value but preferred to submit land use disputes to judicial
procedures.203 In other words, the desire to protect sentimental value did not
dictate their choice of venue, and respondents prioritized protecting monetary
value over protecting sentimental value.204 Nevertheless, Markell, Tyler, and
Brosnan argue that in a realm where “sentimental values are important,
procedural justice is particularly important to stakeholders.”205 Depending

198. Id. at 61.
199. Id. at 61.
200. Simpson, supra note 188.
201. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 35.
202. See David Markell et al., What Has Love Got to Do with It?: Sentimental Attachments
and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VILL. L. REV. 209 (2012).
203. Id. at 229.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 260.
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on the context, procedural justice might require a neutral decision-maker, or
it may require public decision-making in the form of a referendum.206
While the framework is helpful, it does not dictate a conclusion. This part
describes various failures of public participation fora. These failures ought
to inform proposals to redesign public participation processes, a task I
undertake in Part IV.
A. Public Participation Provides a Forum for Local Prejudice and
Misinformation
Public participation proponents often cite the importance of local
knowledge in determining how best to craft a real estate development
project.207 Residents have lived experience with local traffic patterns, noise,
crime, and other aspects of living in a neighborhood. Public participation
proponents argue that local knowledge is necessary to craft an appropriate
redevelopment project.208 While they, like Professor Carol M. Rose, may
acknowledge that locals lack technical expertise, public participation
proponents nevertheless advocate for hearings and charrettes, arguing that
these serve as educational fora. Participation serves procedural goals: “to
publicize issues, to draw in interested parties, to examine alternative
solutions, and to satisfy the public that the issues have been fully
explored . . . . [T]hey give interested persons a sense of participation in the
decision . . . .”209
It is hard to square theoretical insistence on knowledge sharing and
dialogue with the experience of attending public hearings related to the
planning process, whether related to comprehensive planning, rezonings, or
approvals for individual projects. This should not be a surprise. “Passing
judgment on the efficacy of a land use decision requires extensive speculation
about proposed future actions. Unlike disputes about liability for past actions
such as nuisance and trespass claims, zoning disputes present largely
counterfactual fact questions.”210 Resident expertise does not lie, however,
in predicting the impacts, from traffic to nearby property values, of a
proposed development project. Local expertise lies, instead, in describing
the current neighborhood and expressing desires for the neighborhood’s
future. These are necessary, but not at all sufficient, elements of an effective
neighborhood planning process.
In fact, local accounts of the effects of a proposed development often
conflict. Where neighbors disagree, one will accuse the other of seeking to
cash out. Where an expert opinion contradicts residents’ preferences,

206. Id. at 241.
207. See Fennell, supra note 142, at 391 (recounting the importance of soliciting public
input given land use law’s theoretical grounding in the need to coordinate uses across many
property owners).
208. See supra Part II.C.2.
209. Rose, supra note 139, at 897.
210. Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55, 60
(2012).
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residents do not seek to understand complicated engineering reports and
traffic studies. Instead they retrench, discredit expert opinions procured “for
hire,” and insist on the merits of local knowledge over outsiders’ expert
opinions. Residents insisting that the traffic volume is higher than a traffic
study suggests will argue that the expert conducted the study on a slow day.
Rarely do residents leave a room having questioned the assumptions with
which they walked in.211
Public hearings do not resemble the rational, problem-solving dialogues
described by participation proponents. They consist largely of one person
after another using the allotted time to recite the assumptions with which they
entered the room, refusing to question those assumptions, cheering others
who hold the same assumptions and jeering at people who do not. These are
often more shouting matches than conversations. They certainly are not
dialogues that result in an informed consensus.
In one telling example drawn from legislative advocacy work done by the
clinic that I teach, a homeowner sought a special permit to expand her

211. William Marble & Clayton Nall, Where Self-Interest Trumps Ideology: Liberal
Homeowners and Local Opposition to Housing Development, 83 J. POL. 1747, 1761–62
(2021) (finding that ideological arguments for housing development were unlikely to shift
homeowners’ views enough to overcome considerations based on self-interest); Plaintiffs’
Consolidated Opposition to Defendants Village of Garden City’s, supra note 157, at 23
(“Another example of the subtle forms of discrimination in this case is the way that the
residents continued to claim that their opposition was based on . . . concerns over schools and
traffic issues even after [the city’s consultant] explained that multi-family zoning would be
more to their advantage on these issues than single-family zoning.”); Sean Tubbs, Albemarle
Planning Commission Pans Multifamily Development After Focused Opposition from
Neighborhood,
CHARLOTTESVILLE
CMTY.
ENGAGEMENT
(Mar.
5,
2021),
https://communityengagement.substack.com/p/albemarle-planning-commission-pans
[https://perma.cc/4J3F-6LQZ] (recounting public hearing presentation by homeowners’
association that hired an independent consultant to challenge developer’s traffic study); see
also KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 118, 120 (2020) (describing one resident who
“commissioned his own traffic study as he feels the impact of cars and children on the area
have not been adequately addressed” and another who “critiqued a developer’s traffic study
and stormwater analysis” based on his own engineering knowledge). But see Jerusalem
Demsas, How to Convince a NIMBY to Build More Housing, VOX (Feb. 24, 2021, 10:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/22297328/affordable-housing-nimby-housing-prices-rising-poll-datafor-progress [https://perma.cc/E3PN-FT3S] (describing poll results showing that strong
economic arguments for upzoning may be more effective in shifting voter opinions). The
death of local journalism only exacerbates this problem. No impartial source exists to make
sense of the morass of contradictory information presented at land use hearings. Untrained
journalists, operating Patch and Patch-like websites, serve as mouthpieces for NIMBYs.
Neighborhood-based social networking sites, such as Nextdoor, are even worse. See RANDY
SHAW, GENERATION PRICED OUT: WHO GETS TO LIVE IN THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 197 (2020)
(describing online organizing efforts on Nextdoor to defeat pro-density and affordable housing
legislation in Noe Valley, California); Kate Walz & Patricia Fron, The Color of Power: How
Local Control over the Siting of Affordable Housing Shapes America, 12 DEPAUL J. SOC.
JUST., Winter 2018, at 1, 9 n.29 (describing opposition to Chicago mixed-income development
project in “a closed Facebook group” whose members “frequently posted thinly veiled
comments rooted in racist and classist misconceptions about affordable housing and voucher
holders”).
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home-based day care.212 Applicable state law prohibits towns from erecting
zoning and other local law barriers to state-licensed home-based day cares
that serve no more than six children.213 This means that no town can override
a person’s right to operate such a day care. Unfortunately, towns are
permitted to require operators of larger home-based day cares, serving
between seven and twelve children, to seek zoning approvals.214 A child care
provider in Fairfield County, Connecticut, sought to expand her existing
program, which served six children, to serve twelve children.215 The Zoning
Board of Appeals denied the provider’s application twice.216 As required by
the local zoning code,217 notice of the public hearing at which her application
would be considered was delivered to her neighbors.218 One of her neighbors
organized the other neighbors in opposition to the project.219
The applicant’s neighbors testified against issuance of the permit.220
Unaware that land use approvals often devolve into popularity contests, the
applicant had not rallied anyone to testify in support of her application.221 It
quickly became clear that the neighbors’ “local knowledge” contradicted
objective truths. First, they made claims about the provider’s expertise in
child care,222 refusing to acknowledge that she was, in fact, licensed by the
State of Connecticut223 and had a certification in early childhood
education.224 Nothing in the record suggested that the applicant, an African
American immigrant, was inexperienced. Second, and crucially, until they
received notice of the application to increase the day care capacity, the
212. See Hearing on S.B. 87 Before the Conn. Gen. Assembly Hous. Comm., 2021 Leg. 98
(Conn. 2021) [hereinafter S.B. 87 Hearing] (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma
Maison Childcare).
213. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3j (2021) (“No zoning regulation shall treat any family
child care home . . . in a manner different from single or multifamily dwellings.”); id. § 19a–
77(a)(3) (defining a “family child care home” as “a private family home caring for not more
than six children”).
214. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2(d)(1) (West 2021) (“Zoning regulations . . .
shall not . . . [p]rohibit the operation of any family child care home or group child care home
in a residential zone”), with id. § 8-3j (providing only that family child care homes—not group
child care homes—must be treated the same as “single or multifamily dwellings” by applicable
zoning regulations). See also id. § 19a–77(a)(2)(A) (defining a “group child care home” as a
facility in which “not less than seven or more than twelve related or unrelated children [are
cared for] on a regular basis”).
215. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma
Maison Childcare).
216. Id.
217. See STAMFORD, CONN., ZONING REGULATIONS § 19.C.3(a) (2021).
218. See Zoning Board of Appeals, CITY OF STAMFORD, at 2:34:25–2:34:35 (May 9, 2018),
http://cityofstamford.granicus.com/player/clip/7118?view_id=19&redirect=true.
219. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma
Maison Childcare).
220. See Zoning Board of Appeals, supra note 218, at 3:09:52–4:13:22.
221. See id. at 2:34:02–4:19:35 (showing testimony from many opponents of Ms. Lauture’s
application and testimony from only Ms. Lauture and her attorney in support of the
application).
222. See id. at 4:01:12–4:01:31.
223. S.B. 87 Hearing, supra note 212 (testimony of Emmanuella Lauture, Owner, Ma
Maison Childcare).
224. Id.
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neighbors were all unaware that a day care already operated on the site.225
Whatever their concerns about noise and parking might have been, surely the
fact that they had never noticed six children making noise and six families
dropping off children at the site daily ought to have been informative.
In a recent interview, Warren Logan, an Oakland transportation planner,
describes the problem succinctly. Individuals have important knowledge
about their daily commutes. Every day they make informed decisions about
how to get to work efficiently. As a transportation planner, Logan wants to
hear directly from commuters, especially those least likely to attend a formal
public meeting. Logan acknowledges, however, that commuters’ knowledge
has limits:
If you ask a lot of people . . . what would you do to fix the congestion
problem, they might say ‘widen the road.’ And from an engineering
standpoint, that is the last thing you should do. That’s where a
transportation planner has to wrestle with what people might assume would
be the best solution, and what is technically the best situation, without being
[paternalistic].226

Note that while some public participation is willfully ignorant or dishonest,
Logan worries that even well-intentioned (but inexpert) participation can
have nefarious impacts on local development and governance decisions.
It is hardly surprising, then, that when a development is built despite public
opposition, it often does not yield the negative impacts anticipated by public
testimony. One frequently hears from neighbors of once-controversial
development projects: “Now that it’s in, it’s ok.” One of the most
contentious real estate developments of the last century was the Ethel R.
Lawrence Homes, the affordable housing project built as a result of Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.227 Neighbors
decried the development’s potential nefarious impacts: lower property
values, more crime, more traffic, and overburdened public schools.228 The
project was built only after decades of civil rights litigation.229 Examining
the impacts of the Ethel R. Lawrence Homes on both residents and neighbors,
researchers found that none of the claimed nefarious impacts came to pass.230
Neighbors were even wrong about the impact on property values, a data point
one might assume could be reliably crowdsourced.231 The development had

225. See Zoning Board of Appeals, supra note 218, at 3:03:22–3:03:32, 4:14:00–4:14:10.
226. Sarah Holder, A City Planner Makes a Case for Rethinking Public Consultation,
CITYLAB (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/08/cityplanning-transportation-oakland-community-engagement/596050/ [https://perma.cc/U9UARV6L].
227. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (finding that New Jersey municipalities must zone in
furtherance of statewide general welfare and, in doing so, accommodate the development of
affordable housing).
228. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 44, 46 (2013).
229. See id. at 41–43.
230. See id. at 65–70.
231. See id. at 118–19.
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significant positive impacts on the people who moved in,232 none of whom
were “existing residents” or “neighbors” whose views would have been
credited or prioritized during the public participation process.
Relatedly, as Professors Katherine Levine Einstein, David M. Glick, and
Maxwell Palmer recount at length, participants in public processes often
present irrelevant information.233 An apartment building in a suburban town
might, for example, require public hearings in the context of receiving
approval from an inland wetlands agency or a board of zoning appeals. The
applicable statute will establish what information is relevant to the agency or
board’s decision. Perhaps the inland wetlands agency must consider
drainage and the possibility that the development will increase the frequency
of local floods. Members of the public will often appear and testify as to
wholly irrelevant matters.234 A common example is professed concern for
public finances, where a member of the public will argue that the
development will increase government expenditures, by increasing crime or
the population of school-age children, and fail to bring in commensurate
property tax revenues. The argument is wholly irrelevant to the question at
hand but undoubtedly has an impact on the board or agency members hearing
it. There is no mechanism to limit such comments, much less their effect on
decision-makers.
Professor Rose acknowledges that public processes can involve more
venting than information sharing.235 She argues, however, that public
processes remain valuable because they facilitate mediated decisions that are
less likely to lead to litigation. Unfortunately, the mediated results are
generally predictable and often bad. Public participation processes, as
documented by researchers, decrease the amount of new housing constructed
and increase the number of parking spaces.236 Both of these “mediated”
results inflate housing prices with little commensurate societal benefit.237 As
one recent paper concluded, “the degree of political opposition to housing
development predicts higher prices” and, because “[o]pposition to housing
development is more likely in areas with highly educated non-Hispanic
White residents,” there are implications for segregation.238 Where the results
predictably preference a privileged subset of the citizenry, mediation is not a
legitimizing force.

232. See id. at 148–84. Because of the overwhelming demand for the units at Ethel
Lawrence Homes, tenants were selected on a “first come first served” basis. See id. at 62. The
tenant selection process made it possible for researchers to compare life outcomes between
those who were selected and those who were not. See id. at 125. It also created a situation in
which, even if public participation processes had been open to and inclusive of future
residents, those future residents had very little incentive to participate, because any one
potential tenant had a small chance of success in obtaining a unit, even if it were built.
233. See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 87–88, 92–93.
234. See id.
235. See Rose, supra note 139, at 898.
236. See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 53.
237. Id.; see also DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 152–53 (2005).
238. ROTHWELL, supra note 9, at 11.

1122

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Because public hearings impose minimal constraints on public testimony,
public participation processes do not provide a mechanism for resolving
conflicting testimony or preferences. Even literature lauding the ability to
meet progressive goals by using public participation processes recognizes
that the community does not speak with one voice. Professors Foster and
Glick, for example, describe various entities claiming to speak on behalf of
the community in the context of Columbia University’s expansion plans in
West Harlem.239 Ironically, Glick’s client, a nonprofit community group
governed by low-income neighborhood residents, questioned the legitimacy
of the Community Board, a hyperlocal governmental structure erected in
response to the failures of urban renewal.240 Professor Cummings describes
a divide between community organizations in Los Angeles, not on the
substance of the redevelopment proposal, but on the question of whether the
agreement between the coalition and the developer ought to require the
groups to cede the right to challenge the redevelopment’s approvals during
the local administrative process.241 Under these circumstances, it is not at all
clear that public participation yielded a “better” result, as conveyors of local
knowledge disagreed. Disagreement among locals can lead to confusion,
delay, and additional costs. Professor Einstein tells the story of an affordable
housing development incurring over one year of delay and $100,000 of
additional costs to address neighbor concerns regarding traffic, only to be
delayed further by a second group of neighbors who were not involved in the
first dispute.242
B. Public Participation Protects Social Capital, but the Wrong Kind
There may be reasons why low-income communities merit public
participation rights, even when such rights are inappropriate in wealthy
communities. Low-income communities may be heavily reliant on spatially
constrained social capital.243 As just one example, in her book All Our Kin,
Professor Carol B. Stack documents the ways in which low-income Black
communities rely on family and friends for daily needs, such as child care.244
New development might disrupt those relationships by displacing a friend or
relative or increasing transportation time between a child’s home and her
239. Foster & Glick, supra note 76, at 2010, 2016. Foster and Glick also discuss a
controversy over which community group, if any, had the authority and legitimacy to represent
existing residents of central Brooklyn in connection with the large-scale redevelopment of
Atlantic Yards. Id. at 2025.
240. Id. at 2050.
241. Cummings, supra note 100, at 66 (noting that various groups “split over the final terms
of the agreement, with AGENDA and the community coalition refusing to sign on as coalition
members, citing the waiver of the right to oppose the project as incompatible with their
organizational missions”).
242. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 26.
243. “Social capital” refers to “the ways in which individuals and communities create trust,
maintain social networks, and establish norms that enable participants to act cooperatively
toward the pursuit of shared goals.” Foster, supra note 124, at 529.
244. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY
90–107 (1974).

2021]

OVERPARTICIPATION

1123

grandmother’s. Low-income families lack the wealth and income to easily
replace such relationships with marketplace transactions. It might be more
crucial to maintain social capital networks in low-income communities than
it is in more well-off communities, where a decrease in social capital might
have less devastating negative impacts.245 Professor Sheila Foster endorses
New York City community organizations’ advocacy to protect community
gardens cultivated on municipally owned lots as one example of social capital
meriting protection.246 New York City sought to sell the lots to housing
developers.247 Foster does not expressly say it, but presumably one reason
that it is especially important to protect community gardens in low-income
neighborhoods is that community residents cannot easily replace those
resources once lost. On the other hand, one might be skeptical of a wealthy
suburb “conserving” land on which a developer seeks to develop affordable
housing because the town’s residents likely do not lack access to open
space.248
Social capital, however, is a fraught concept. While in popular literature
it is presumed to be an unmitigated good, in reality, social capital has a dark
side.249 It can be used either to include—bridging social capital250—or
exclude—bonding social capital.251 Relying on social norms rather than
legal rules to ensure that public participation is dialectic, inclusive, and
productive is not likely to be a successful strategy.
In fact, exclusionary bonding social capital is more common than
inclusionary bridging social capital.252 The former cements insular
communities while the latter brings disparate groups together. Even the most
lauded of public participation processes, upon examination, are often
examples of bonding, not bridging, social capital. Crafting participation
processes requires determining who the participants ought to be. The more
limited the community, the easier it is to define and meet its needs.
Communities based on sharing a common space, such as a workplace or
neighborhood, are likely to be better organized than those based on some
other common trait. Broader communities are more likely to include
245. In insular wealthy communities, if the social capital disrupted is bonding, rather than
bridging, the disruption may actually have positive impacts. (For explanations of bonding and
bridging social capital, see infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.) Successful
desegregation efforts might fall into this category of positive social capital disruptions.
246. See Foster, supra note 124, at 575–76.
247. See id. at 535.
248. See supra note 157. Well-off suburbs and their residents routinely purchase land
slated for multifamily housing and, instead, dedicate it to “conservation.” See Ellickson, supra
note 12, at 1616; Thomas, supra note 189; PREVOST, supra note 157, at 99–100.
249. See generally Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital
Revolution in Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013).
250. Id. at 819.
251. Id. at 818.
252. See id. at 841 (“Bridging capital often has a limited radius, necessitating a plethora of
bridging ties to ensure broader solidarity (for example, labor unions bridged across race but
not income). And once achieved, bridging ties and capital may morph into bonding capital.
While bridging capital has some value to residential property, it is doubtful that it can fully
remedy the negative externalities of local bonding capital.”).
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divergent perspectives and desires that then need to be mediated and
compromised. As a result, the project of defining the community is more
likely to be exclusionary than inclusionary.
Where historic and current racial discrimination and segregation have
created the community in question, the notion of community is even more
problematic. In fact, some of the most active participation fora are those
focused on exclusion. Professor Barbara L. Bezdek cites both business
improvement districts (BIDs) and suburban NIMBYs as examples.253 The
problem, however, is not specific to these public participation processes. As
one academic planner observing land use processes in a range of New
England towns, from rural to urban, noted: “Governments with jurisdiction
over large numbers of people tend to serve unusually heterogeneous
constituencies . . . . [T]he racial, ethnic, and class differences within [an
urban] constituency make it difficult for residents to build the coalitions
necessary to challenge the developers’ control of the regulatory process.”254
A difficulty of using social capital and community preservation theory to
undergird policy is that it is not easy to define social capital with precision.
Commentators are quick to conflate social capital with a predetermined good.
As Professor Stephanie M. Stern describes it, “social capital is present when
positive effects accrue . . . . [T]here appears to be no upward bound on the
amount of social capital deemed optimal for communities.”255
Returning to urban renewal’s textbook example, one New Haven
neighborhood, Wooster Square, is often held up, in contrast to the rest of the
city, as an urban renewal success story.256 As you might hear the story from
a local tour guide, having seen the failures of urban renewal in other New
Haven neighborhoods, Wooster Square residents organized to protect their
neighborhood when it was targeted for construction of I-91.257 For much of
the twentieth century, Wooster Square was a tight-knit community comprised
mostly of Italian immigrants and their descendants.258 They successfully
convinced local and federal authorities to reroute the proposed highway a
few blocks east of the neighborhood heart, Wooster Square Park.259 They
also persuaded authorities to allocate money to renovate existing housing
rather than raze it and replace it.260 Luisa DeLauro, who later served as the
neighborhood’s alder for a record-setting thirty-five years, and her husband

253. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 15; see also Smith, supra note 51, at 264; Kenneth A. Stahl,
The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 487, 509–10 (2017).
254. RUDEL, supra note 180, at 124.
255. Stern, supra note 249, at 818.
256. Adrien A. Weibgen, There Goes the Neighborhood: Slums, Social Uplift, and the
Remaking of Wooster Square 2 (Yale L. Sch. Student Legal Hist. Papers, No. 24, 2013),
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=student_leg
al_history_papers [https://perma.cc/2LRX-UZL8].
257. See id. at 8–10.
258. See id. at 4–6.
259. See id. at 9–10.
260. See id. at 14–16, 39.
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Ted led the movement.261 Today, a sculpture dedicated to DeLauro sits in
Wooster Square Park. It is a stylized kitchen table, intended to pay homage
to DeLauro’s own kitchen table, said to be the headquarters for the
community organizing campaign.262
Like the sculpted kitchen table, the tour guide account is stylized. It
excludes a significant portion of the history. The location to which I-91 was
rerouted was also a residential portion of Wooster Square.263 Urban renewal
in Wooster Square did in fact raze housing—the housing occupied by the
poorest Wooster Square residents.264 In its place, urban renewal built a
highway and, on the other side of the highway, cleared plots for light
industrial development.265 The Wooster Square public participation process
was successful in part because it excluded people.266 Organizers limited the
community they represented to residents between Olive and Hamilton
Streets, a span of just half a mile.267 Nearly everyone east of Hamilton
Street268 was displaced to make way for I-91 and light industrial
development,269 just as residents of Oak Street270 and the Dixwell
neighborhood had been displaced in the preceding decades.271 In fact, almost
8000 people, the residents of 70 percent of housing units in Wooster Square,
were displaced.272 More people were displaced during Wooster Square’s

261. See Mary O’Leary, Luisa DeLauro, Mother of Connecticut U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro,
Dies at 103, NEW HAVEN REG. (Sept. 10, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/news/
article/Luisa-DeLauro-mother-of-Connecticut-U-S-Rep-12187053.php
[https://perma.cc/P5BR-SE7N] (noting that “the DeLauros had a lot of influence in finding
homeowners who used . . . tax credits and renovation grants to fix up neglected properties in
the area”). Luisa DeLauro’s daughter, Rosa DeLauro, has served as the neighborhood’s
congresswoman since 1991.
262. See id.
263. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 12–13.
264. See id. at 10.
265. See id. at 26–27; COHEN, supra note 54, at 130.
266. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 19–24.
267. See id. at 19.
268. The one housing development permitted to remain standing was a public housing
project called Farnam Courts. See id. at 11. For decades, Farnam Courts stood sandwiched
between I-91 and a coal-fired power plant, until the power plant was shuttered in 1992. See
English Station, NEW HAVEN BLDG. ARCHIVE (Apr. 27, 2019), https://nhba.yale.edu/
building?id=58e6b948adb817121752a5f4 [https://perma.cc/TRB9-A5YM].
269. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 8–13.
270. See id. at 14, 22, 24. At the time it was destroyed, the Oak Street neighborhood was
very diverse and included African American, Jewish, Irish American, and Italian American
households. See id. at 22; RAE, supra note 54, at 137, 271.
271. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 51. Dixwell was then and is now the smallest
neighborhood in New Haven. As of 2017, Dixwell’s population was just 5000 people.
INSPIRED CMTYS., INC. & DATAHAVEN, NEWHALLVILLE AND DIXWELL NEIGHBORHOOD
COMMUNITY INDEX 2 (2019), https://www.ctdatahaven.org/sites/ctdatahaven/files/
Newhallville_Dixwell_Neighborhood_Index_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T3F-Q3PH].
Nevertheless, it was historically the commercial and cultural center of New Haven’s Black
community. See MANDI ISAACS JACKSON, MODEL CITY BLUES: URBAN SPACE AND ORGANIZED
RESISTANCE IN NEW HAVEN 55, 67–69 (2008).
272. See Weibgen, supra note 257, at 51.
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urban renewal “success story” than during the rest of New Haven’s urban
renewal horror stories.273
One need not rely on historical examples to make this point. Digging
deeper into Foster’s account of community gardens, one finds community
activists seeking to protect a limited resource for their own benefit at the
expense of a larger pool of people who could use the land if it were developed
as housing.274 The social capital story is not straightforward. If the gardens
served as a venue for socializing and community organizing across existing
communities, however defined, perhaps they advanced bridging social
capital—which is not easily replaced. If, however, they served preexisting
insular communities, they were hardly irreplaceable. If the plots were few
and limited, it is far from clear that the gardens served a greater good than
additional housing did. In fact, by pushing rents for existing housing down,
the construction of new housing might have served to advance existing social
capital by limiting displacement.
In her examination of community meetings, even in an urban
neighborhood, sociologist Eva Rosen expressly found that “although lowand middle-class blacks live in close proximity, this does not lead to the
creation of bridging social capital.”275 In her in-depth examination of the use
of housing choice vouchers in a low-income, Black Baltimore neighborhood,
Rosen finds that community meetings are generally attended by local
homeowners who are skeptical and weary of the role that renters and
voucher-holders play in their neighborhood:
These “community” meetings are in fact only attended by a very particular
segment of the community. Not only were they older. Not only were they
largely homeowners. They were homeowners who lived in [relatively
well-off pockets of the neighborhood] . . . . And fewer renters know about
the community meeting.276

Rosen recounts attending one such meeting with Sue, a Black renter and a
lifelong neighborhood resident. Even though Sue is the same race as the
majority of other community residents in the room and occupies a similar
income stratum, she does not feel comfortable participating in the meeting.
In practice, the community meeting is for homeowners, not renters, and she
knows her input is not welcome.277 As Rosen describes it:
The “community” meeting was only geared toward a certain segment of the
community. It’s an example of bonding social capital, where people with
things in common—in this case homeowners—can share information and
skills and gain access to resources such as the energy grant. But the
273. See id.
274. See Foster, supra note 124, at 535–36 & n.29.
275. EVA ROSEN, THE VOUCHER PROMISE: “SECTION 8” AND THE FATE OF AN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 184 (2020).
276. Id.
277. Id. (“Although Sue is an unassisted renter in Oakland Terrace, she grew up in a family
with a similar class background as many of the meeting attendees. Yet she felt alienated at
the meeting because she was one of the few renters, and her concerns and needs were different
from those of the residents at the meeting.”).
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community meeting fails to build bridges across groups—even though it
could do so in theory—because its agenda is constructed by a single group
of people, that is, homeowners.278

Because exercising social capital through local community meetings and
local government processes is likely to result in insularity, it actually
“increase[s] the need for legal safeguards.”279 Land use public processes are
not immune:
“[s]ocial capital theory itself may justify land use
protectionism.”280 Social capital cannot serve as a blanket rationale for
public participation. A more nuanced understanding of social capital ought
to inform a redesigned role for public participation.281
C. Public Participation Redistributes Wealth and Resources, but in the
Wrong Direction
Arguments about social capital preservation are explicit in the community
development and land use literature.282 In theory, public participation
opportunities also provide a mechanism to counterbalance low-income
people’s inability to participate in the marketplace.283 Today, low-income
communities lack control over their neighborhoods in part because they
cannot leave their neighborhoods. Market power requires the ability to exit
and to exercise purchasing ability. Low-income residents have less ability to
exit both because of irreplaceable social capital and because of their lack of
wealth.284 Moving is expensive. And the more desirable a neighborhood is,
the higher the cost of housing in that neighborhood. Because poor people
cannot effectively participate in the marketplace, perhaps they require a
greater ability to participate in the public process around real estate
development.
The majority of low-income people who live in low-income
neighborhoods, however, cannot exercise power and influence by testifying
at local land use hearings simply because, without new development, there

278. Id. at 185–86.
279. Stern, supra note 249, at 820.
280. Id. at 849.
281. Notably, Stern takes a cautious approach, not advocating against all devolved
decision-making but, for example, arguing for a “more cabined role for neighborhood direct
democracy programs.” Id. at 856.
282. See supra Part III.B.
283. Presumably, the effects of urban renewal on communities of color would have been
substantially less disastrous had displaced families had the resources to depart for more
desirable neighborhoods. That is, in fact, what happened to white families displaced by urban
renewal who, unlike their Black counterparts, enjoyed access to subsidized mortgage lending
and a welcoming suburban housing market. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 65, 70, 74 (2017).
As Rothstein recounts, the housing market was not just unfriendly to Black individuals, it was
violent—and that violence was undertaken under color of law.
284. Notably, the inability to exit or credibly threaten to exit also dampens the efficacy of
low-income people’s exercise of public participation rights. As Carol M. Rose puts it, “the
opportunity for exit has been a constant threat behind voice at the local level.” Rose, supra
note 139, at 886.
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are no land use hearings to attend.285 The value of increased participation
opportunities accrues only to people living in the places facing development
pressures. Public participation empowers only those people who live in
neighborhoods attractive to developers, and those people are
disproportionately well-off. Most low-income neighborhoods are not facing
gentrification pressures.286 Only a small minority of all low-income people
reside in desirable, gentrifying neighborhoods.287
Finally, while participation proponents cite a need to counterbalance
developers’ market power, they do not often acknowledge the power
imbalances inherent to public participation fora. There is nothing inherently
inclusive about participation.288 And the political sphere often replicates the
inequities apparent in the economic sphere. It is hardly surprising, then, that
researchers studying participation processes find that participants are not
representative of the broader population289 and that participants’
contributions are not valued equally.290
Researchers find that participants testifying at Boston-area land use
hearings are whiter, wealthier, and more opposed to housing development
than the population of the neighborhoods in which they reside or voters in
those neighborhoods.291 Even in wealthy towns, the people who participate
in land use hearings are still wealthier than their average neighbor.
285. Some scholars estimate that only 20 percent of low-income census tracts underwent
gentrification in recent decades. See Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification, Displacement, and the
Role of Public Investment, 33 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 31, 33 (2018). Other studies suggest that
even fewer low-income areas have gentrified. See MALLACH, supra note 95, at 123–44.
However, low-income communities are disproportionately targeted for undesirable uses, such
as the operation of power plants. These uses are often subject to a different land use and public
participation regime centralized at the state level. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-20a
(2021) (requiring undesirable facilities seeking to locate in heavily impacted neighborhoods
to engage in additional community engagement and public participation prior to filing permit
applications). This is, in any event, properly addressed with enhanced participation rights tied
specifically to environmental injustices and limited to communities disproportionately
impacted by such uses. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Sen. Kamala D. Harris, Harris, Booker,
Duckworth Introduce Comprehensive Legislation to Help Achieve Environmental Justice
for
All
(July
30,
2020),
http://web.archive.org/web/20200809065634/
https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press-releases/harris-booker-duckworth-introducecomprehensive-legislation-to-help-achieve-environmental-justice-for-all.
286. See MALLACH, supra note 95, at 102, 111; JASON RICHARDSON ET AL., NAT’L CMTY.
REINVESTMENT COAL., SHIFTING NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL
DISPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN CITIES 4, 29 (2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/
[https://perma.cc/9QG5-88K4] (navigate to the link labeled “Download the full report
(PDF)”). And even where there are gentrification pressures, often that gentrification manifests
as converting four-unit townhomes to single-family houses, a conversion that does not require
land use approvals. See Godsil, supra note 170, at 334.
287. See Zuk et al., supra note 285, at 33; MALLACH, supra note 95, at 123–44.
288. “[T]he ability of groups to participate—and the likelihood that such participation
actually shifts policy outcomes and power disparities—depends critically on how much power
is actually at stake in the first place.” K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional
Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 722 (2020).
289. See generally EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211.
290. See generally Caroline S. Tauxe, Marginalizing Public Participation in Local
Planning: An Ethnographic Account, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 471 (1995).
291. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 109.
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Unsurprisingly then, almost two-thirds of mayors nationwide report that
while “policy areas like schools and policing [are] dominated by majority
public opinion,” when it comes to housing development, “a small group with
strong views” dominates public discussion.292
Other research concludes that even where participation is widespread,
authorities use race and class to prioritize some voices over others. “[Setting
participation as a goal] assumes that government can employ neutral tactics
and obtain a fair result even in the face of significant hierarchies of
power,”293 but there is no reason to make such an assumption. In fact,
participants with less formal education, less wealth, and less political power
can be “systematically disempowered by the formal planning process, so that
their voices carr[y] less weight in decisions.”294 A host of illegitimate factors
will influence a decision-maker’s willingness to take testimony seriously.
Researchers posit that those factors include homeownership status,295 the
likelihood that participants might bring litigation to enforce their preferences,
and participants’ ability to make political donations or otherwise influence
the electoral process.296 These factors vary positively with household wealth
and income. As a result, public participation processes do not counteract
wealth and income disparities; they exacerbate them.
Even the most vocal proponents of robust public participation recognize
the power differentials that manifest in these processes:
The applause [for the principle of citizen participation] is reduced to polite
handclaps, however, when this principle is advocated by the have-not
blacks, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos, and whites.
And when the have-nots define participation as redistribution of power, the
American consensus on the fundamental principle explodes into many
shades of outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and political opposition.297

In the context of public participation processes associated with
environmentally hazardous land uses, a key member of the environmental
justice movement noted that these processes, far from being progressive in
their impact, redistributed environmental resources from poor to rich:
While the drafters of environmental laws may have thought those laws were
“neutral,” their application has caused the inequities in the siting of
unwanted facilities. The result of the laws is unequivocal: poor people and
Id. at 119.
McFarlane, supra note 51, at 917.
Tauxe, supra note 290, at 472.
See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 890, 904–10 (2011) (describing lack of evidence to support commonly held
assumptions about homeowners’ engagement in their communities as compared to renters’
engagement). Ultimately, “[t]he pattern that emerges across multiple, large-sample-size,
well-controlled studies is that homeownership increases voting, property upkeep, and some
forms of local investment, but has no or modest effects on neighboring, socializing, working
to solve local problems, or participating in voluntary or local organizations.” Id. at 929.
Notably, homeowners’ self-interest drives exclusionary behavior and policy preferences that,
if redistributionist in effect, redistribute wealth from the poor to the well-off. See id. at 907.
296. See Tauxe, supra note 290, at 478.
297. Arnstein, supra note 151, at 216.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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people of color bear a disproportionate share of environmental burdens.
And while we may decry the outcome, environmental laws are working as
designed.298

When public participation motivates decision-making, formal rules and
standards suffer. “Lacking substantive standards, such statutes depend on
the vigor of the political process for achieving environmental goals. In the
end, it is those with political clout who win in the administrative process or
siting decision.”299
Even within racial and class groups, public participation prioritizes and
entrenches status differentials.300 Homeowners have more legitimacy than
renters. Long-standing, and therefore older, residents have more legitimacy
than recent transplants, who will generally be younger. The identity of
participants and the perspectives they provide are predictable and, as
recounted above, the tone of the hearings is angry.301 As a result, people
with conflicting perspectives choose not to participate.302
Where an administrative body fails to advance redistributive goals despite
public participation, the public participation requirement itself does not
provide a mechanism to challenge the substance of the decision. Public
participation requirements are procedural in nature and, where they are not
met, they give rise to procedural attacks. Such attacks can delay
development, sometimes enough to kill a development, particularly given the
cyclical nature of real estate markets.303 While the settlement process might
further redistributive goals, there is no guarantee that this will take place. In
fact, the mediated settlement often involves concessions that increase the cost
of housing, a result contrary to progressive goals.304 A well-designed public
participation process ought to tackle and address these power differentials.
D. Public Participation Prioritizes Current Residents, but at the Expense
of Everyone Else
As described above, public participation proponents routinely assume that
the people most affected by a real estate development project already live in
the neighborhood where the development will take place.305 This assumption
is echoed in public participation processes, which prioritize existing resident
voices in formal and informal ways. Formally, only neighbors typically
receive notice of public hearings mailed to their homes.306 Some zoning
enabling acts and zoning codes also require posted notice in addition to
298. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 646 (1992).
299. Id.
300. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 184–201 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text; infra note 372.
303. See Smith, supra note 51, at 271.
304. See EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 4.
305. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
306. See 3 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S: THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING § 57:53 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2019).
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mailings307 but, again, existing residents are the people most likely to see the
posted notice. Informally, planning and zoning commissioners tend to
prioritize the voices of existing residents. When delivering testimony, people
commonly describe themselves not as neighbors or residents, but as
homeowners, and recite the length of their tenure in the neighborhood, all to
secure legitimacy in the eyes of the people—themselves disproportionately
homeowners—making land use planning decisions.308
Certainly, existing residents are affected by new development in a way that
others are not. New construction may deviate from their previous
expectations as to what local resources their property affords them,
regardless of whether the property is owned by a homeowner or leased by a
tenant. Courts and legal scholars have long prioritized owners’ expectations
when considering whether certain property rights ought to be protected.309
Prioritizing the preferences of existing residents makes neighborhood
change more difficult. Even if one assumes that existing communities
deserve more say in development than outsiders do, the tools available to
existing communities are crafted to delay development and preserve the
status quo, rather than to encourage the development of beneficial goods and
resources. Zoning codes that prioritize the status quo risk sacrificing one of
the key characteristics of the urban environment:
dynamism.310
Demographics change. Average household size changes. The average
number of children per family changes. The average age at which people
become parents changes. Birth rates go up, and birth rates go down. Housing
preferences evolve. The nature and location of jobs and industry respond to

307. See, e.g., PARK RIDGE, ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.3(c) (2019).
308. See, e.g., John Eligon, Residents Feared Low-Income Housing Would Ruin Their
Suburb. It Didn’t., N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/us/
affordable-housing-suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/X5GL-AC22] (quoting resident: “We
built our brand-new home here because we worked hard to become residents . . . not because
we got a handout, not because somebody paved the way for us”); Jacqueline Rabe Thomas,
Many Ideas, but Little Agreement, on How to Address Connecticut’s Affordable Housing
Issues, CONN. MIRROR (Mar. 18, 2021), https://ctmirror.org/2021/03/18/many-ideas-but-littleagreement-on-how-to-address-connecticuts-affordable-housing-issues/
[https://perma.cc/X7FS-X758] (recounting a hearing before a Connecticut state legislative
committee in which one participant testified, “[a]s a homeowner, we should be able to have a
local voice”); Doug Trumm, How I Was Sidelined from the Wallingford Community Council,
URBANIST (May 30, 2016), https://www.theurbanist.org/2016/05/30/how-i-was-sidelinedfrom-the-wallingford-community-council [https://perma.cc/HK5W-KZSM] (describing
neighborhood council election dominated by homeowners); see also Erica Drzewiecki,
Housing Project Plan in Newington Faces Opposition, NEW BRITAIN HERALD (Aug. 28, 2018,
7:21 PM), http://www.newbritainherald.com/NBH-Newington+News/334189/housingproject-plan-in-newington-faces-opposition
[https://perma.cc/P764-BTNA]
(quoting
resident: “I’m not in favor of this [affordable housing] project for the lovely town of
Newington where I’ve lived most of my life”).
309. See Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 431, 462 (2015)
(arguing that expectation ought to play a lesser role in property theory when property is
distributed highly unequally and often unjustly).
310. Lemar, supra note 49, at 1539–42 (arguing that defining “aesthetic zoning codes” by
reference to existing housing entrenches status quo housing design without regard to the
benefits of neighborhood change).
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technological innovation and economic booms and busts. Transportation
costs rise and fall.
Neighborhoods, particularly those proximate to amenities, must evolve as
well. Too often neighborhoods are not allowed to change as a result of land
use regulations, whether aesthetic strictures tied to existing context or
prioritization of existing residents in decision-making.311 As a result, quality
of life suffers because households are not able to find housing that meets their
needs and preferences. Poor households are most likely to lose when demand
outpaces supply. It is no surprise, then, that empiricists studying public
participation in land use hearings worry that “rather than empowering
under-represented interests, these institutions could, in fact, be amplifying
the voices of a small group of unrepresentative individuals with strong
interest in restricting the development of new housing.”312 In practice, when
residents are asked to respond to changes in their community, they will opt
for the status quo over new development.313
1. Everyone Else Incurs the Costs of Sprawl
When law makes public participation core to the redevelopment process,
development will be easier and cheaper in places where there is no public to
participate. Unfortunately, urban redevelopment is significantly more
difficult than greenfields development, which uses farmland and forest land
to build housing, rather than redeploy sites in the urban core adjacent to
transit and jobs.314 Redevelopment requires engaging in land assemblage
and wading through messy title histories and encumbrances.315 Urban sites
are often brownfields, requiring cleanup and assignment of existing and
potential liabilities to those harmed by pollutants.316 Despite these
hindrances to development, urban parcels are expensive as a result of their
proximity to transportation infrastructure and jobs.317
One oft-overlooked component of the urban redevelopment process is the
cost and indeterminacy resulting from public participation. Developers can
identify zoning requirements by reading a zoning code and can do so before
incurring significant predevelopment expenditures. No one, however, can
predict what is likely to arise out of the public participation processes. Those
processes, moreover, do not begin until developers invest significant funds
in the design and engineering process. Public participation, therefore, puts
significant predevelopment expenditures at risk. Subdividing a farm into
one-acre residential lots is not likely to affect any existing residents and is
311. See generally Lemar, supra note 49.
312. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 15–16.
313. See FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 329.
314. See Michael Lewyn, Yes to Infill, No to Nuisance, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 849–
50 & n.56 (2015) (defining “‘greenfield’ sites”).
315. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 81, at 62 (“Assembling small parcels into meaningful sites
can be prohibitively expensive and is further complicated by the fact that a number of city,
state, and federal agencies each control land and fight over turf.”).
316. Id. at 63.
317. Id. at 57.
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unlikely to give rise to public outcry. Because low-income people are less
likely to participate in public meetings and receive less credence from
decision-makers, public participation processes may also direct
redevelopment projects to poor neighborhoods rather than wealthy ones,
potentially resulting in displacing gentrification.318
Requiring the expenditure of significant predevelopment dollars before
one can apply for approvals does not simply raise the cost of development.
It also erects a barrier to entry for those developers who cannot afford to risk
predevelopment expenditures.
Expensive predevelopment processes
privilege large-scale developers who diversify their risk across multiple
projects. Developers with the political power to push through despite public
opposition benefit from barriers to entry erected by public participation
processes. Such processes disadvantage small-scale developers.
Extensive, unpredictable public participation processes, then, are simply
one additional barrier to redirecting housing development from sprawling
suburbs to existing infrastructure in already-developed cities and suburbs.
And because the processes privilege the participation of well-off neighbors,
they also direct development away from desirable, well-resourced, wealthy
neighborhoods to low-income neighborhoods with less political power to
oppose development.
2. Everyone Else Incurs Higher Housing Costs
Public participation processes also enable anticompetitive behavior by
homeowners. The trope of the all-powerful developer looms large in the
arguments of those who seek to increase local residents’ opportunities to
participate and influence private development.319 Recent empirical work,
however, calls into question the hypothesis that developers control local
politics.320 As theorized by Professor Robert Ellickson as early as 1977, and
subsequently developed further by Professor William Fischel, homeowners
exert disproportionate power in the planning process—and they exert their
power in order to stymie, rather than to encourage, development.321
While both developers and tenants have an interest in abundant supplies
of housing, landlords and homeowners do not. “The residential owner role
in particular comprises a perceived prerogative to exert control over housing
supply and the social composition of residents . . . . [I]t is not surprising that
land cartelization and NIMBYism are little-questioned aspects of residential
life.”322 Homeowners and landlords use the regulatory tools at their disposal
(i.e., zoning laws) to limit construction of new housing. Zoning is often “the

318. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 45–46.
319. See supra Part II.A.
320. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the
Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 231–33 (2014); Schleicher, supra note
103, at 1698.
321. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 406 (1977); FISCHEL, supra note 40, at 292.
322. Stern, supra note 249, at 862.
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product of entrenched economic interests engaging in protectionism and
burdening the broader public to further their own economic interests. The
politics of property protection change considerably with increased attention
to these dynamics.”323
Homeowners not only act in their self-interest—property value
preservation and inflation—they conflate their self-interest with the public
interest. Processes that preference the “community” and define the relevant
community as current residents or homeowners embrace a kind of “greed is
good” approach to policymaking. Homeowners at land use hearings
frequently testify that a zoning decision is in the public interest only if it
inflates or preserves property values.324 “Social capital theory thus
entrenches private-regarding norms by eliding a balancing between broader
social benefits and local group interests and claiming that action to advance
the latter will provide the former.”325 Conflating homeowners’ self-interest
with the public interest then “deters communication to understand the needs
of the larger community.”326
In fact, homeowners can be analogized to cartels.327 Robert Ellickson first
posited an economic model centered on the monopolistic behavior of
homeowners in a 1977 article.328 Cartels coordinate behavior among firms
in an effort to inflate prices and maximize profits to cartel members; one
mechanism is to depress production of a good.329 As a result, buyers overpay
and “scarce capital [remains] in the hands of persons who are not using it

323. Serkin, supra note 107, at 8.
324. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 11, Step By Step, Inc. v. City of Ogdensburg, 176 F. Supp. 3d 112 (N.D.N.Y.
2016) (No. 7:15-CV-925), 2015 WL 13021218 (quoting public comment in opposition to
proposed rezoning for mental health support home: “[W]e need new single family homes to
enhance our tax base, not the proposed [project] to drain our home equity”); Josh LaBella,
Fairfield Residents: Proposed 5-Story Apartment Complex ‘Detrimental’ to ‘Safety and
Well-Being,’ CTPOST (Sept. 20, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://www.ctpost.com/local/article/
Fairfield-residents-Proposed-5-story-apartment-15577896.php
[https://perma.cc/TE7SQN33] (quoting neighborhood organization president’s claims that “predatory developers . . .
‘reap[] the benefits’” of Connecticut’s builder’s remedy statute “to the detriment of
neighborhood property values”).
325. Stern, supra note 249, at 864.
326. Bezdek, supra note 48, at 15.
327. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 195 (2009) (“Local land use policies
and regulations also give homeowners certain cartel rights by letting them (but typically not
renters) object to requests for zoning changes.”).
328. See Ellickson, supra note 321, at 400–03.
329. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
885, 886–87 (2012). It is reasonable to wonder why homeowner cartels—comprised of many
individual parties, more than would generally be considered sustainable for a cartel—do not
fragment. The answer is likely twofold. First, unlike other cartels, they have access to a
statutory enforcement mechanism—zoning—and need not rely on more informal mechanisms
of enforcement. Second, as set out by William Fischel, homeowners’ investment risk is
undiversified and their interests are unidimensional, providing little incentive to break off from
the cartel. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES (2005).
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efficiently.”330 Because cartels involve multiple producers, they must
include a mechanism by which producers coordinate behavior.331 Zoning
codes play this role in the case of homeowners depressing housing production
and inflating housing prices. While cartels are typically prohibited by
section 1 of the Sherman Act,332 in the case of housing, “the suburban land
cartel is more effective than traditional cartels because members can openly
coordinate behavior and have a perfect mechanism to enforce mutual
compliance: zoning law.”333
Because they are comprised of multiple firms, each of which can act on its
own, cartels, unlike monopolies, are fragile creatures. Each member stands
to profit by breaking away from the cartel. As a result, the cartel must create
and enforce a mechanism to prevent each member’s departure. In order for
a cartel to sustain itself, it must have mechanisms both to know when an
individual member has broken away and to punish individual members when
they do so. As Professor Christopher Leslie explains,
[c]artels try to create stability through enforcement regimes. In order to
deter cheating and to remedy cheating when it occurs, stable cartels need
to develop enforcement mechanisms that monitor the sales (and prices)
of cartel members, penalize firms that sell more than their cartel allotment,
and compensate those who have not received their agreed-upon share of
the cartel profits.334

Cartelization, then, often requires two stages.335 In the first stage, the
actors “reach[] a consensus on a plan to restrict output or otherwise curb
rivalry.”336 In the second stage, the cartel must track each member’s output
and punish those who overproduce.337 All the while, the cartel must erect
barriers to entry by new firms not subject to the cartelization plan.338 Zoning
serves multiple functions in this schema. It is the primary enforcement
regime that applies to any firms that enter after adoption of the cartelization
plan. It also serves as a barrier to entry, barring firms that might desire to
produce more housing than set out in the cartelization plan.339
330. Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 61 (1996).
331. See Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing the Conspiracy’s Books: Inter-Competitor Sales
and Price-Fixing Cartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018).
332. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
333. Dietderich, supra note 330, at 61.
334. Leslie, supra note 331, at 1, 2.
335. Randall D. Heeb et al., Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the
Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 216–17 (2009).
336. Id. at 217.
337. See id.
338. See id. While this analysis focuses on the need for the cartel to manage individual
homeowners, it is also the case that, for exclusionary zoning to have effects on the larger
market, there is also the need for a cartel manager to manage across local governments.
Ellickson analyzes the management of the cartel across localities. See Ellickson, supra note
321, at 434.
339. By upzoning statewide, states can limit local authority to zone in ways that limit or
strip supply constraints from the zoning code. These interventions go to the heart of the
homeowners’ cartel’s efforts to constrain supply so as to increase price.
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Within that larger regime, public hearings before planning and zoning
boards serve an important function. Public hearings permit the cartel to track
individual members’ commitment to the profiteering enterprise. The loudest
objectors to a project will solicit signatures on petitions and donations to fund
lawyers. They will ask their neighbors to put up lawn signs and testify at
hearings. The public hearing process gives cartel leaders an opportunity to
determine if there are cartel members at risk of breaking away. It also permits
the cartel to punish those who do not commit themselves to the cartel.340
Homeowner cartels abuse the power allocated to individual actors in the land
use planning process. In the words of one scholar, “[a]lthough the right to
exclude may be an essential stick in property’s metaphorical bundles, it is a
right to be exercised by and for the benefit of individuals, not a tool for
inequitable, collective control.”341
While at least one scholar acknowledges that conventional arguments in
favor of public participation empower NIMBYs alongside the urban poor,342
no public participation proponent proposes a mechanism by which to
distinguish the disenfranchised poor from the well-connected rich. Damon
Y. Smith argues that urban poor public participants are not guarding the
status quo but simply trying to influence the nature of the change.343 He does
not set forth a normative position that would permit courts or other
decision-makers to distinguish between the two.
As described in this part, project-specific public participation is an
ineffective approach to addressing gentrification and other problems facing
low-income communities. Worse, by facilitating exclusion in well-off
neighborhoods, it exacerbates the housing affordability crisis.
Ultimately, the question of what role public participation ought to play is
one of institutional design.344 What should the public participation process
look like? Who are the decision-makers, how are they selected, and at what
points in the process do they make their decisions? In various spheres of
local government, these questions are contested constantly, from whether to
have elected or appointed boards of education,345 to what powers ought to be

340. At a small-town New England land use hearing at which I represented the applicant,
one project opponent compared neighbors’ objections to the development to puritanical social
policing as described in The Scarlet Letter. The project opponent did not make the comparison
as a critique but instead as a celebration of neighbors’ efforts to control development. The
project opponent implored the commissioners to understand that, consistent with New
England’s puritanical roots, there were and there ought to be “social strictures, there were
social behaviors—this is the land of shunning and social regulation on what people would
build, what people would wear.” Application of Thomas and Elizabeth Halsey for a Certificate
of Design Appropriateness to Construct a New Single Family Dwelling at 28 Potter Court, at
30 (Noank Fire Dist. Zoning Comm’n July 17, 2012) (transcript on file with author).
341. Boyack, supra note 164, at 497.
342. Smith, supra note 51, at 256–57.
343. Id. at 266.
344. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 682.
345. See Sam Brill, The Law of School Catchment Areas, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349,
364 (2019).
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held by civilian review boards in the policing context.346 Part IV proposes a
redesign of land use public participation.
IV. REDESIGNING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCESSES
It is not enough to say that public participation is important. The design
of community engagement processes matters. Only a well-designed process
can ensure that “countervailing interests and community groups . . . assert
their views, to hold governments and other actors to account, and to claim a
share of governing power.”347
Crafting an effective community engagement forum requires responding
to the various ways in which existing public participation processes fail, not
just their potential to succeed. When public participation motivates
decision-making, formal rules and standards suffer. As argued above,
current public participation structures preference some voices over others,
put a thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo, and fail to ensure that
irrelevant, often false, information does not drive the decision-making
process. As a result, public participation processes delay development, direct
development to poor neighborhoods and greenfields, and increase the cost of
housing.348 A redesigned public participation process ought to avoid these
results. An effective public participation system must account for the way in
which the current system disadvantages already disadvantaged voices,
redistributes wealth upwards, equates local knowledge and local self-interest,
stifles change, and slows housing development to the detriment of housing
affordability.
State zoning enabling acts and local zoning ordinances ought to prioritize
public participation where local knowledge is necessary and relevant to
decision-making. Simultaneously, these laws must acknowledge where local
knowledge is irrelevant at best.349 And they ought to require rigorous data
collection, investigation, and analysis in addition to—and as a check
346. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 701. As Professor Monica C. Bell has
explained in the criminal justice context, community engagement can take many forms. See
Monica C. Bell, The Community in Criminal Justice: Subordination, Consumption,
Resistance, and Transformation, 16 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON RACE 197, 198 (2019).
It can be transformational, upending policymaking and perceptions about what is possible. Id.
More frequently, however, even people who are not abused by and even benefit from the
existing system exert no control over that system. Id. They do not influence it, they simply
enjoy its benefits, while being lucky not to be subjected to its failures.
347. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 690.
348. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2493 (2018) (“Conventional
approaches to participation and accountability have had mixed results in the context of
[housing] . . . provision.”). Rahman’s discussion is not limited to housing and instead focuses
on basic necessities, which he sometimes terms “public goods.” See id. at 2450. Housing does
not meet the classic definition of a public good, though it is undoubtedly a basic necessity.
349. None of this is to suggest that fixing the process can fix the substantive problem of
massive artificial constraints on housing production (though a more robust planning process
would, one hopes, force states and local governments to focus on the connection between
zoning and housing prices). States ought to narrow local governments’ zoning authority so as
to remove their ability to constrain supply. See Lemar, supra note 163, at 353.
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against—public participation. For example, rather than rely on current
property owners’ fears about possible property value depression, planners
can look to data: “Hedonic regression analysis can measure the effects of
particular uses—from wind turbines to community gardens—on neighboring
property values. Grounding land use decisions in these data represents a
considerable advance over proceeding by intuition.”350 Effectuating these
reforms requires returning to the Standard Act’s original distinction between
zoning decisions and adjustment decisions.351 The planning and zoning
process ought to be informed, not dictated, by public participation. There is
little place for public participation, however, at the time of individual
development approvals.
A. Learning from Other Administrative Processes
Public participation is important to planning processes, but we should be
deeply skeptical of public participation’s role in approving any individual
development proposal. Introducing public participation requirements at the
stage of individual development approvals encourages communities to be
reactive rather than proactive. It detracts from the planning and zoning
process by giving angry neighbors an opportunity to kill a project even if the
project is consistent with state and local law, including laws concerning
planning and zoning. The planning process is undermined by inconsistent
application of law (the plan and the zoning) to fact (a specific development
proposal).
Recall the distinction between planning and zoning processes and
adjustment decisions (development approvals) described in Part II. As
described above in Part III, residents can identify problems in their
neighborhood and their wishes for the neighborhood. These inputs are
fundamental to, but should constitute just one component of, the planning
and zoning process. But public participation and hearings are less
appropriate when an individual developer seeks development approvals—a
variance, special exception, or a rezoning specific to its parcel. In these
cases, the code and the zoning enabling act set applicable standards and
factors that ought to be applied by a neutral arbiter.352
If the planning process is robust, we should be able to make the
development approvals process more predictable.353 Most forms of
development ought to be as-of-right under the zoning resulting from the
planning process. Skeptics might point out that development approvals
processes attract more participation than planning processes do. That,
however, is precisely the problem created by the current system. Under the

350. Fennell, supra note 142, at 392.
351. See supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
352. Contemporary planning processes frequently collapse the distinction between
planning and zoning—a fundamental problem with contemporary zoning ordinances. See
supra Part I.B.
353. This proposal is consistent with the push for stronger planning, as discussed in Hills
& Schleicher, supra note 12, at 116–17.
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current system, there is little incentive to participate in the planning process,
as the approvals process for any given development, subject to the whims of
those who choose to testify, does not respect the planning document. As a
result, fewer people participate in planning, and those who do participate are
undermined by later participants in the development approvals process. If
the planning process mattered and was less subject to being overruled during
later development approvals processes, it would attract more attention and
participation.
Thankfully, we have an off-the-rack solution. Like the federal
Administrative Procedure Act354 (APA), the Model State Administrative
Procedures Act355 (“Model State APA”) includes public participation, but
does not rely on participation as a primary legitimating force. Instead, it
relies on the agency’s rigorous evaluation of the substance of the decision in
question, taking into account both public comment and the agency’s
independent analysis. Courts considering whether a regulation meets the
requirements of the APA look to whether there is reasoned decision-making,
consistent with the authorizing statute, for the regulation.356
Similarly, legislatures, local governments, and courts ought to distinguish
between rulemaking (zoning regulations) and contested cases (development
approvals) in the land use context. Undoing the collapsed distinction requires
both changing formal rules regarding public participation and trusting the
planning process enough to permit more uses as-of-right in the zoning code.
As Professor Adam MacLeod argues, in the land use context “courts
generally fail to distinguish between facial and as-applied challenges, [and]
between
generally-applicable
regulations
and
individualized
assessments.”357 Like courts, state zoning enabling acts and local agencies
also ought to recognize the difference between development approvals and
adopting and amending generally applicable zoning ordinances. Public
participation is appropriate in the zoning process but not in the development
approvals process.358
With respect to public participation requirements, contemporary zoning
enabling acts should distinguish between zoning decisions and development
approvals. Consistent with the Standard Act and the Model State APA,
public participation should be welcome at the planning phase and cabined at
the development approvals phase. In the planning phase, zoning enabling
acts ought to identify substantive ends for planning processes359 and require
that planners and commissioners consider all available data, including public
354. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
355. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010).
356. Id. § 508 cmt.
357. MacLeod, supra note 210, at 55.
358. In the development approvals process, participants should meet the standard for
intervention if they seek to participate. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT
§ 409.
359. MacLeod, supra note 210, at 57 (“[S]tate legislatures should amend their enabling acts
to require local governments to articulate specific means-ends . . . .”).
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comment, when making zoning decisions intended to serve those ends. The
agency ought to issue written decisions that respond to the comments
submitted. At the development approvals phase, most development ought to
be as-of-right, consistent with the plan. And where an agency is applying a
regulation to a specific applicant, as is the case with development approvals,
public participation is not appropriate. The conditions of approval ought to
be objective. At neither phase should commissioners be permitted to punt
decision-making to popularity contests in the form of public hearings.
Robust judicial review must support these changes.
B. Planning as Rulemaking
Public participation requirements are appropriate at the planning stage,
including adoptions of and revisions to comprehensive plans, zoning codes,
and zoning maps. At the planning stage, information received from the
public can be both vetted and supplemented as part of a more wide-ranging
rulemaking process.
1. The Role of States
Community control can entrench structural inequality when the
neighborhoods exercising that control are highly segregated along race and
class. Professors Jocelyn Simonson and K. Sabeel Rahman argue that truly
empowering input must happen “upstream,” at a stage in the administrative
process when real choices are made.360 When places are segregated and the
places where poor people live are themselves poor, “upstream” must include
changes at the state and federal levels, not just at the local and neighborhood
levels.
Two things must happen upstream. First, where statewide interests are at
stake, some actual policymaking and planning must happen at the state
level.361 In other words, if the local approvals process constitutes planning
and dealing, some issues that may otherwise come up in a negotiated result
should be nonnegotiable because they result in an undersupply of housing or
other nefarious effects. Second, the state must lay out local public
participation requirements and limitations, as proposed in the remainder of
this part. Finally, state law must require that local planning is meaningful.
In order to be meaningful, local plans must be regularly updated, and they
must address the goals enunciated at the state level. The resulting plan must
have the force of law, or the planning process must ensure that the plan is
immediately translated into an enforceable zoning code.362

360. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 725–27.
361. See Lemar, supra note 163, at 296.
362. An example is Minnesota’s Metropolitan Land Planning Act, which included a
planning requirement that ultimately gave rise to a citywide upzoning in Minneapolis in
November 2020. Stephen P. Katkov & Jon Schoenwetter, Minneapolis’s Great Experiment:
An Introduction to the Minneapolis 2040 Comprehensive Plan, BENCH & BAR MINN., Mar.
2020, at 21, 23.
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2. Setting Out Goals and Purposes
Some zoning enabling acts no longer enumerate purposes of zoning,363 as
the Standard Act did.364 While the purposes listed in the Standard Act are
overly broad, states ought to remove vague, easily manipulated purpose
provisions, such as “consideration as to the character of” the zoning
community.”365 And they ought to identify data relevant to those purposes,
such as impacts on housing affordability, public health, and environmental
impacts, such as vehicle miles traveled. While the agency will receive
comments that are unrelated to the inquiry at hand, the Model State APA’s
requirements that the agency explain the final rule366 and respond to
comments367 can, in effect, cabin the impulse to subject decision-making to
a popularity contest. The process must be able to discern opposition based
on facts from opposition based on bias or irrational fear.368
Because zoning is biased in favor of the status quo,369 the planning process
ought to be framed in terms of change. What about their community would
participants like to see improved? As Warren Logan suggests,370 even when
they do not have the expertise to posit solutions, residents can identify
problems which then might be solved through better planning and land use
decisions. A planning process that explicitly describes the problem paves the
way for later determinations of whether the problems have, in fact, been
solved or exacerbated. In the context of planning and rezoning decisions,
363. California and Massachusetts, for example, do not have purposes provisions in their
zoning enabling acts. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65000–66499.58 (West 2021);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (2021).
364. See STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 13, § 3.
365. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2(a) (2021). Connecticut, at the urging of fair housing
advocates, has enacted legislation that strips from the zoning enabling act authorization for
towns to adopt zoning provisions aimed at preserving the “character” of their communities,
recognizing that this overly broad term has been used to perpetuate segregation. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2(b)(3) (West 2021) (replacing considerations of “character” with
considerations of “physical site characteristics”); id. § 8-2(d)(10) (prohibiting municipalities
from considering neighborhood “character” when reviewing most land use applications).
However, legislators were so troubled by the removal of “character” considerations in zoning
that they replaced it with an equally nebulous definition: “physical site characteristics.” Id.
§ 8-2(b)(3).
366. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 313 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010).
367. Id. § 313(1).
368. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has described this
distinction as follows: “[c]ommunity opposition . . . based on factual concerns (concerns are
concrete and not speculative, based on rational, demonstrable evidence, focused on
measurable impact on a neighborhood)” and opposition “based on biases (concerns are
focused on stereotypes, prejudice, and anxiety about the new residents or the units in which
they will live).” U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD GUIDANCE, ASSESSMENT OF FAIR
HOUSING TOOL FOR STATES AND INSULAR AREAS, app. C at 3 (2016). See infra notes 382–88
and accompanying text for a discussion of potential lessons one might draw from this tool.
369. Bob Ellickson uses the term “frozen neighborhoods” to describe the many ways in
which planning law works to halt the evolution of urban and suburban places. Ellickson, supra
note 248, at 1. In my own work, I have described this phenomenon as “zoning as taxidermy.”
See generally Lemar, supra note 49.
370. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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bureaucrats and commissioners ought to solicit public input widely, from
within the city limits and beyond. Logan describes attending community
festivals and get-togethers to solicit perspectives on local transportation
infrastructure.371 He does not rely exclusively on traditional public meetings,
which, he explicitly recognizes, preference the perspectives of “wealthy
homeowners.”372 There is no reason to preference the neighbors, and
participation ought to be solicited broadly. While zoning enabling acts
require that notice be given to neighbors,373 anyone ought to be able to
register with the state to receive notice of land use hearings.374 This would
allow affordable housing advocates, the homebuilders’ lobby, disability
advocates, advocates for social services agencies, and others to receive notice
and share their expertise. Crucially, however, the results of those
participation processes must be filtered through planners and commissioners
required to consider factors other than public opinion as presented in the
public process.
3. Inclusive Public Participation
Traditional public hearings are insufficient and should be supplemented
with outreach to community organizations, historically disenfranchised
communities, communities unlikely to attend public hearings, and
communities susceptible to silencing by traditional public hearings.375 The
zoning enabling act or zoning ordinance ought to set precise processes for
outreach and require the planning agency to interrogate whether the
community engagement process was effective. The process ought to reach
those least likely to attend and testify at traditional public hearings through
outreach at public schools, neighborhood festivals, and religious institutions:
places where people congregate even if they do not have strong feelings
about real estate development. In addition, the participation process must
rely on data collection requirements to ensure that effective outreach occurs.
Robust data collection requirements, reviewable by courts, are crucial to
ensuring that public outreach is effective.
The substantive rulemaking inquiry must include the opportunity for
public comment and, at the agency’s discretion, may include a public
371. See Holder, supra note 226.
372. Id. At an event sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis
City Councilperson Lisa Bender recounted advising planning staff to talk to people about their
lives at festivals in addition to holding meetings required by statute. She also described
hearing from renters that they would not attend formal hearings because their opinions were
discounted in those fora. Minneapolis Fed, Fall 2019 Institute Conference—Day 1, YOUTUBE,
at 3:28 (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRMdqU0IIqs [https://perma.cc/
97QL-T7AU].
373. See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.
374. Connecticut requires each individual town to make such registries available. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8-7d(g)(2) (2021). There is no mechanism for individuals or organizations to
register with the state. Instead, one must register with each of 169 towns plus every sub-local
government—such as fire districts, homeowners’ associations, and beach associations—that
exercises zoning authority by delegation of the State of Connecticut.
375. See supra note 372.
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hearing.376 The same requirements should apply to zoning decisions.
Testimony ought to be limited to certain subject matters listed in the zoning
enabling act. The Model State APA anticipates that agencies will make
extensive use of the internet to publicize and receive comments. In the land
use context, this mechanism can serve to counter the overinfluence of
“neighborhood defenders”377 and “homevoters.”378 Even so, in addition to
receiving public comments, given the politicized context of land use
decisions, it is likely that local agencies will often choose to hold public
hearings even though such hearings are, in theory, optional.
The scope of agency review ought to be broader than simply hosting public
hearings and channeling public input.379 As is the case in other regulatory
processes, the planning and zoning process should be accompanied by
rigorous data collection, including regarding the state’s housing needs.380
Rigorous data consideration and a judicial review process that ensures that
decisions are based on data ought to be legitimating forces. The
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) rule—adopted pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act381 by the Obama-era Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and revoked and replaced by Trump’s HUD—can
serve as a model.382 The AFFH rule “is significant not only as it applies to
the AFFH mandate but also more broadly as a potentially innovative
mechanism that could herald experimentation and new approaches to realize
equity concerns more broadly.”383 The Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH)
rubric required localities that receive certain federal funding to complete a
detailed analysis, based on data provided by HUD, relating to segregation.384
The AFH also required significant community engagement including, but not
376. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 306 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010). The Model State APA also noted that “Article 2 is intended to
provide easy public access to agency law and policy that are relevant to agency process.” Id.
§ 201 cmt.
377. See generally EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 211.
378. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 329.
379. The process could require, for example, as Professor Tim Iglesias has proposed, that
zoning jurisdictions expressly consider impact on housing affordability. See Tim
Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing Regulation
While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 476–77 (2003) (“The HIA requirement would
be enacted by state statute to promote this goal. The statute would consist of procedural
requirements . . . and an explicit legislative policy that local governments ‘avoid or mitigate
significant adverse housing impacts whenever it is feasible to do so.’”).
380. Surprisingly few states require local governments to consider housing affordability
and need in their planning and zoning process. Exceptions include New Jersey and, in recent
years, California.
381. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
382. Ironically, HUD suspended typical public participation requirements in connection
with revocation of the AFFH rules. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Secretary
Carson Terminates 2015 AFFH Rule (July 23, 2020), https://www.hud.gov/press/
press_releases_media_advisories/hud_no_20_109 [https://perma.cc/8VWY-NCYK].
383. Katherine M. O’Regan & Kenneth Zimmerman, The Potential of the Fair Housing
Act’s Affirmative Mandate and HUD’s AFFH Rule, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., 2019,
no. 1, at 87, 95.
384. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 368, at 2–3.
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limited to, public hearings.385 The tool also required a description of
outreach activities, including using “media outlets” and reaching out to
“organizations” in an effort to reach “populations that are typically
underrepresented in the planning process.”386 It required an explanation of
“how these communications were designed to reach the broadest audience
possible.”387 In addition, the tool required the agency to evaluate the success
of its outreach efforts.388
One can imagine a similar tool—to be completed in the process of
rendering zoning decisions—that would require substantial engagement with
the actual impacts of planning and development, rather than the perceived
risks of changing the status quo.389 Just as existing regulatory processes
typically require a fiscal impact analysis or a small business impact
statement, in the planning and zoning context, a state statute might require
agencies to conduct housing affordability and fair housing analyses.390 The
analysis ought to consider the impact of a proposed change, as well as the
impact of doing nothing.
4. Reasoned Explanations
Under the Model State APA, following receipt of public comment, an
agency must issue a final rule, accompanied by an explanatory statement that
responds to “substantial arguments made in testimony and comments.”391
Only then is the regulation entitled to judicial deference. Similarly, the AFH
rubric required agencies to “[i]nclude a summary of any comments or views
not accepted and the reasons why.”392 The requirement that the agency
explain its reasoning and respond to the arguments is key.
Narrowing the scope of testimony, as permitted by the Model State APA’s
evidentiary rules,393 does not address the problem of veracity. Therefore,
385. Id. at 1.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See id.
389. Consider, for example, the housing impact statement advocated for in Roderick M.
Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
81, 127 (2011), or the requirement, proposed by South Central Los Angeles-based activist
coalition UNIDAD, that cumulative development approvals result in no net loss of affordable
units. See THE PEOPLE’S PLAN: EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR SOUTH LOS ANGELES 13
(2017),
http://www.unidad-la.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/peoples-plan-reportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B9N-LHTG].
390. See Iglesias, supra note 379, at 477 (discussing hypothetical state statutes that would
require housing impact analyses).
391. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 313 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010). This requirement echoes the requirements of the federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires “[a]ny state or local government that forbids
the placement of a wireless service facility must state its reasons in writing and must support
its reasoning with ‘substantial evidence.’” MacLeod, supra note 210, at 84 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)).
392. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 368, at 1.
393. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 404(2).
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rather than allow an individual’s testimony—whether or not true—to stand
on its own, the process ought to require bureaucrats and commissioners to
address in writing the substance of all comments made, thus limiting a
comment’s effect and impact if it is irrelevant or untrue or a resident
overstates its importance.
Requiring planners and commissioners to issue reports elucidating the
results of public participation and the planners’ and commissioners’
responses to those comments serves an important documentation role, as
well. Urban planning and zoning are marred by over a century of
segregationist approaches to city and town design.394 Because our towns and
cities are highly segregated, simply permitting local control to guide
development decisions can perpetuate segregation. Planning and zoning
laws should require planners and commissioners to explain their decisions
rather than simply say that members of the public supported or did not
support a particular choice. If an explanation is not required, there is no
protection against the possibility that a proposal simply lost a public hearing
popularity contest.
Unfortunately, judicial review of zoning decisions, in its current form,
does not correct for the failures of the public participation process. Review
is highly deferential and, in many cases, does not require that the
decision-making body explain its decision.395 Judges ought to defer only
where the agency has demonstrable expertise and the agency’s written
explanation of its decision substantively engages with the comments
received.396 Professor Nestor M. Davidson, in his analysis of local
administrative law, argues that judicial review ought to “bolster procedural
regularity where appropriate, but recognize that informality may have a place
to play in local administration.”397 In his estimation, “[c]ourts policing the
somewhat more porous lines between local government and public
involvement in the work of that level of government should, at a minimum,
acknowledge that public involvement carries benefits as well as causes for
concern, with appropriate procedural and ethical safeguards.”398 In the case
of local land use administration, courts ought to formalize and limit public
participation in recognition of the role that public participation plays in
regressive wealth distribution, housing price inflation, and segregation.

394. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 283, at 53–54; TROUNSTINE, supra note 9, at 205.
395. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons
from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 729–37 (2008) (collecting cases and
explaining development of deferential judicial review standard vis-à-vis local zoning
decisions); see also MacLeod, supra note 210, at 111–12 (proposing that “states should require
regulatory authorities to state the reasons for their decisions contemporaneous with their
decisions and might attach to any subsequently promulgated regulations without an
accompanying statement a presumption of arbitrariness”).
396. See Ostrow, supra note 395, at 729–37.
397. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 610 (2017).
398. Id. at 617.
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C. Applying the Rule: As-of-Right Development
A robust plan accompanied by predictable zoning ought to lead to more
as-of-right development.399 If the planning process is robust, it cannot leave
a door open for the law to be applied inconsistently by allowing deviations
from the plan guided only by public participation. The exercise of discretion
at the development approvals stage undermines the public participation,
expertise, and data analysis that inform the underlying planning and zoning.
There are models for more state planning resulting in enhanced rights for
developers at the local level. As I have discussed elsewhere, states have
removed local discretion (and, therefore, local public participation) in
connection with various land uses—from home-based child care to solar
infrastructure—determined by state actors to be necessary uses that are too
often subject to local vetoes unconcerned with broader societal welfare.400
Similarly, “anti-snob zoning acts” cabin the considerations that can be taken
into account when local zoning authorities refuse to permit the construction
of affordable housing, effectively limiting the relevance and scope of public
participation.401
There are nascent efforts to build and improve upon these models.
Recognizing a statewide housing affordability crisis, Oregon recently made
duplexes and four-family homes developable as-of-right throughout the
state.402 That is to say, if a proposed residential development meets the
standard set out in state statute and regulations, the developer can secure a
permit to build without undergoing a lengthy approvals process accompanied
by public hearings. Similarly, fair housing advocates in Connecticut seek to
require that approvals processes for multifamily housing look like those
typically applicable to single family housing: as-of-right administrative
approvals with no lengthy process and no public hearings.403
D. Applying the Rule: Development Approvals as Contested Cases
When discretionary approvals cannot be avoided, local zoning codes and
state zoning enabling acts should set forth clear, objective criteria for the
issuance of development approvals. These criteria should be implemented
without lengthy process and untethered discretion.
Again, the Model State APA provides a prototype. Pursuant to the Model
State APA, contested cases, like development approvals, ask an agency to
apply existing rules or law to an individual party.404 In contested cases, an
evidentiary hearing is required if the applicable constitution or statute so

399. “As-of-right development” is sometimes referred to as “by-right development.”
400. Lemar, supra note 163, at 350.
401. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-30(g)–8-30(j) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23
(2021).
402. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.758 (2019).
403. See LCO No. 3562, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2020) (working draft).
404. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 401, 403, 413 (NAT’L CONF.
OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2010).
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provides.405 Evidentiary hearings are public but not generally open to public
participation.406 One may seek to intervene if the applicable statute expressly
permits or if one has an interest that may be adversely affected by the
proceeding.407 The same should be true of development approvals.
The Model State APA does not incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but it does set minimum standards for the evidence presented in a contested
case evidentiary hearing. The Model State APA requires that evidence be
relevant and material: “The presiding officer may exclude evidence in the
absence of an objection if the evidence is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly
repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds or on the
basis of an evidentiary privilege recognized in the courts of this state.”408 In
the courtroom, evidentiary rules exist to ensure that adjudicators, whether
judge or jury, are not swayed by irrelevant, inflammatory, or biased
information. Consideration of a development approval application ought to
be similarly rigorous. Land use public hearings, because they occur before
laypeople, are more like jury trials than they are like bench trials.
Commissioners are often elected and, even when appointed, are not typically
experts in real estate development.409 Excluding irrelevant inflammatory
testimony is particularly important given that commissioners are more like
juries than they are like specialized bureaucrats with significant technical
expertise.
If an applicant demonstrates in an evidentiary hearing that a proposed
development meets the requisite criteria, the local agency should grant the
approvals, just as building permits are issued without lengthy unpredictable
processes.410 If the development approvals result from a process other than
the clear application of law to facts established in an evidentiary hearing, the
planning process, which itself is a statement of public policy informed by
participation, is diluted. If developers can rely on the planning process to set
standards, they can then design their project to meet those standards. If the
planning process is not binding, developers are left, instead, to hazard
guesses as to what project will receive the most positive reception at a public
hearing, or worse, ignore the democratically adopted plan and purchase
support from those constituencies most likely to organize and be
well-received at a public hearing. Further, the ability to rely on the planning
process reduces developers’ information costs, increasing the likelihood of
investment that meets the parameters of the plan and increasing the likelihood

405. Id. § 102(7).
406. Id. § 403(f).
407. Id. § 409(a).
408. Id. § 404(2).
409. Some states have, in recent years, established a training requirement for planning and
zoning commissioners but most states require no such training, much less professional
expertise. See infra notes 417–19 and accompanying text.
410. While building code and permit issuance processes vary across jurisdictions, generally
the public is invited to participate when the government seeks to revise the building code but
there is no opportunity for public input when an individual building permit application is
submitted.
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that smaller-scale developers will be able to participate in the development
process.
E. Informality, Empowerment, and Expertise
I anticipate three primary critiques of my proposal to import the Model
State APA into land use procedure. First, much of the perceived legitimacy
of the current process relies on the degree to which “informality reflects
community involvement.”411
My proposal to increase as-of-right
development, some might argue, will dampen community engagement.
Second, some will argue that my proposal disempowers the powerless, taking
away a lever that marginalized people have used to secure accountability in
redevelopment. Finally, the Model State APA is designed around the
assumption that the decision-making agency is made up of experts, but
planning and zoning commissioners are often laypeople with no expertise in
real estate, development, environmental science, or planning.
1. Informality and Legitimacy
While informality facilitates involvement by some, it does not facilitate
involvement by all. Informality aids current residents who have the time and
privilege to attend local meetings and who are confident that commissioners
will take their concerns seriously. Some constituencies may benefit from
indirect representation. Processes that permit and give credence to social
service agencies, housing activists, and economists might better serve the
interests of people who cannot attend multiple evening meetings at a time of
day when many towns and cities run infrequent—if any—public transit. In
addition, informality disadvantages people who do not meet commissioners’
preconceived notions of whose concerns matter in the planning and zoning
process. Informality provides no mechanism for choosing between
competing notions of “what the community wants.”
Informality functions best as a substitute for direct referenda, in cases
where “[local] agencies serve less as a repository of technical expertise and
more as a mediating body to channel local input and knowledge.”412 As
described above, however, local input is often one-sided, local knowledge is
questionable, and many land use questions are technical ones that require
informed assessment of a regulation’s impact. In the case of many planning
and zoning questions, local agencies do not channel local knowledge so much
as they delegate decision-making authority to a private body, a homeowners’
cartel. A formalized administrative process, one aspect of which is a
functional public participation mechanism open to all, not just current
homeowners, is much preferable.

411. Davidson, supra note 397, at 573.
412. Id. at 573–74.
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2. Securing Accountability
Sometimes informal approvals processes work to the benefit of historically
disempowered groups. Professor Scott Cummings describes powerful
coalitions of environmental organizations, labor unions, and low-income
communities of color uniting to contest development applications and secure
community benefits agreements in Los Angeles. These coalitions, unlike the
homeowners’ cartels described above, are too often temporary. Alliances are
not durable and, as Cummings himself describes, these groups’ interests
often do not align.413 Further, in jurisdictions where, as a result of centuries
of segregation, there are no low-income people and there are few people of
color, public participation processes perpetuate segregation.
While public participation and comment can serve as one accountability
measure, they are not sufficient to bring accountability to redevelopment
processes. Informal processes often empower the already powerful. True
accountability requires standards and rules, developed transparently and
consistently applied throughout the process. Relying on the exercise of
political pressure at the end of an informal process is not likely to serve
progressive values. There is, in the land use context, a “need to reform
democratic institutions in ways that better balance political power,”414 but
informal participation processes are unlikely to serve those ends.
Certainly, participants in the local land use process do not all share the
same motivations, and some might deserve our sympathies more than others.
The fact that a participant is more sympathetic, however, does not mean that
the participant’s testimony is factually accurate (recall Walter Logan’s
distinction between people’s ability to describe problems versus their ability
to solve them).415 Instead, it is appropriate to include, in the purposes set out
in the zoning enabling act, housing affordability, environmental justice,
transportation equity, and involuntary displacement. And it is imperative that
decision-makers rigorously evaluate the impact of their decisions. Relying
on the public participation process to advance these goals is at odds with the
empirical evidence on how these processes operate.
3. Expertise
The law applicable to administrative processes is designed to defer to
reasoned decisions informed by expertise. Not only are planning and zoning
officials generally not required to explain their reasoned decisions, planning
and zoning officials are typically laypeople.416 Indeed, recognizing that
these officials are typically laypeople, sometimes elected rather than

413. See SCOTT CUMMINGS, AN EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES
257 (2021).
414. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 288, at 693.
415. See Holder, supra note 226.
416. See Ostrow, supra note 395, at 735–36 & n.78.
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appointed, New Jersey,417 South Carolina,418 and New York419 have, in
recent years, mandated training for land use officials.
That land use officials lack expertise, however, is not a reason for a more
informal process. Instead, it is a reason to set tighter standards through the
planning process and to allow less discretion and fewer popularity contests
at the development approvals level. Commissioners’ lack of expertise
otherwise empowers public participants whose public hearing testimony is
not vetted by any expert agency.
CONCLUSION
The unmitigated desire for more and more public participation can tie
scholars and advocates into knots. For example, one writer, in the same
article, decries both variances, because they are at odds with community
preference as expressed in zoning code, and as-of-right development,
because it does not provide the opportunity for project-specific public
input.420 If you cannot build things permitted by the code and you cannot
build things not permitted by the code, what’s left? Nothing. While some
may be well served by the status quo bias embedded in our land use planning
laws, most are not. Fixing broken public participation processes is a small
but necessary piece of fixing our broken zoning laws.

417.
418.
419.
420.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-8 (West 2021) (requirement adopted in 2005).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-1340 (2021) (requirement adopted in 2003).
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 27(7-a) (McKinney 2021) (requirement adopted in 2007).
Foster, supra note 124, at 547.

